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Abstract 
Contemporary Scholars assert that one of the factors of economic growth, in addition to the three classical 
factors, i.e. land, labour and capital, is technology.1 Accordingly, in countries which aspire to bring about rapid 
economic growth, access to new technologies is integrally linked to long-standing development priorities.2 New 
technologies may be accessed through either invention or its transfer, or both. Nonetheless, so far, accessing new 
technology through acquisition doesn’t seem a feasible option for least developed countries (LDCs) as they lack 
the required research and development budgets and infrastructures to generate and acquire inventions. In fact, 
recent empirical data reveals that most of the world’s patent right holders of new technologies are nationals of 
developed countries.  This implies that invention processes continue to remain the provinces of these countries in 
the global world.3 Hence, for LDCs, the remaining option of accessing new technologies is TOT. This implies 
that is a last resort as long as these countries insist in their desire to bring about and foster economic growth. 
oreign experiences indicate that the major means of technology transfer are technology transfer agreements, 
management agreements, patent licensing (both voluntary and  compulsory), know- how supply agreements and 
foreign direct Investment (FDI).4 In order to determine whether a country put in place adequate and suitable 
legal and institutional framework for the transfer of technology, one has to closely scrutinize the country’s laws 
that regulate, inter alia,   technology transfer agreements,  patent rights, investment and capital goods leasing. 
This writer intends to address the issue whether the existing Ethiopian patent, investment and capital goods 
leasing laws are adequate enough and capable of ensuring technology transfer to Ethiopia. 
 
1. Introduction to the Concept of Transfer of Technology 
This section is designed to clarify the concept of transfer of technology (TOT). Accordingly, the section explains 
what TOT is. It also highlights the methods by which countries may bring about TOT in to their economy. 
Finally, the common restrictive clauses of TOT agreements will be discussed.  
 
1.1.  Definition 
There is no consensus among authorities as to what constitutes technology or how technology should be defined. 
For the purpose of this paper, technology shall be understood as the knowledge to produce and use tools to 
satisfy human needs either directly or indirectly. It must also be noted that the word “technology” doesn’t only 
refers to technical machinery and equipments and their operations. It also encompasses the notion of “soft 
technology”. Hence, technology includes any integrally associated managerial and marketing techniques that can 
be systematically used for the manufacture of a product, or for the application of a process or the rendering of a 
service.5   
Now, the question is what constitutes TOT? As it is the case with other concepts, authorities have 
difficulties in providing a single workable definition for the term TOT. The American Science Board defined 
technology transfer as “...a wide spectrum of activities, running the gamut from the exchange of ideas between 
visiting researchers to contractually structured research collaborations involving the joint use of facilities and 
equipment.’’ 6  This definition is probably the widest usage of the tem TOT. 7  As per this definition, mere 
exchange of ideas between/among researchers can be considered as TOT. Contrary to this logical inference, the 
                                                          
1 Chantal Thomas, Transfer of Technology in the Contemporary International Order, 22 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL. 2096, 2096 (1998) 
2 Keith E. Maskus & Ruth L. Okediji, Intellectual Property Rights and International Technology Transfer to Address Climate 
Change: Risks, Opportunities and Policy Options, 32 ICTSD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT SERIES. 3, (2010). 
3 Bernard M. Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus   & Kamal Saggi, Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and 
Multilateral Policy Options (Working Paper, 2004), available at 
http://www.betsaonline.com/SystemAnalysis/TransferTechnology.pdf .  
4 David M. Haug, The International Transfer of Technology: Lessons that East Europe can Learn from the Failed Third World 
Experience, 5 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY. 209, 213- 217, (1992).  
5 David M. Haug, supar note 4, at 212. 
6Yong S. Lee, Technology Transfer and Economic Development: A Framework for Policy Analysis, in 1 TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER AND PUBLIC POLICY 22 (Yong S. Lee ed., 1997). 
7 Ibid. 
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general consensus among writers is that any attempt to provide for the definition of TOT must be functional, 
rather than formal. In line of this understanding a certain writer defined TOT as follows: 
“Technology transfer is [a] process by which a technology, expertise, knowhow or facilities 
developed by one individual, enterprise or organization is transferred to another individual, 
enterprise or organization. Effective technology transfer results in commercialization of a new 
product or service or in the improvement of an existing product or process.”1 
For the purpose of the above definition, a mere exchange of ideas is not considered as a technology 
transfer process. It instead limited the scope of TOT to cases that result in the utilization of the transferred idea 
for the production or improvement of goods or services by the receiving party.  
There are also other definitions which suggest that TOT requires a functional component. In this regard 
Harold Brook defined TOT as "the process by which science and technology are diffused throughout human 
activity. 2  In a similar vein, another scholar labeled TOT as “the transmission of know-how to suit local 
conditions . . . .”3  According to both definitions, in order for there to be a true technology transfer from one 
person to another, there must be effective absorption of the transferred technology by the recipient party. 
At the international arena, TOT is discussed in different organizations like the WTO and the UN system 
for years. Yet, there has not been any formal agreement within these bodies as regards the definition of term.  
This being the case, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) tried to define 
technology transfer as: 
 “...the transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application 
of a process or for the rendering of a service and does not extend to the transactions involving 
the mere sale or mere lease of goods.”4 
Like the above functional definitions of TOT, this definition focuses primarily on the actual transfer 
process. It places high weight for the adaption and diffusion of the technology for industrial application. From 
the perspective of UNCTAD’s definition, technology transfer transactions include: 
a) “The assignment, sale and licensing of all forms of intellectual property; 
b) The provision of know-how and technical expertise e.g. plans, diagrams, models, 
instructions, guides, formulae, etc; 
c) The provision of technological knowledge necessary to acquire, install and use 
machinery, equipment, intermediate goods and/or raw materials which have been 
acquired by purchase, lease or other means; and  
d) The provision of technological contents of industrial and technical cooperation 
arrangements.”5 
On the other hand, from the perspective of UNICTAD’s definition, TOT transactions do not include 
transfer of a product, such as a mere sale or lease of tractor, seed or software package.  However, it doesn’t seem 
logical to exclude sale of goods from the ambit of TOT. Sometimes technological know-how may be embodied 
in machines and equipments. In the course of operating these goods, the purchaser may acquire important know-
how for the manufacture or improvements of a goods or service,   or the operation of a process.  
Coming to the Ethiopian legal system, the investment proclamation defines TOT as follows:  
““[T]ransfer of technology” means the transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture 
of a product, for the application or improvement of a process or for the rendering of a service, 
including management and technical know-how as well as marketing technologies, but may 
not extend to transactions involving the mere sale or lease of goods”6 
The above definition is essentially similar to the UNCTAD’s definition of TOT. It includes the transfer 
of both tangible and intangible technologies. It also adopt a functional definition of the term as it emphasizes on 
the application of the transferred technology for manufacturing a product, rendering a service or improving a 
process. As it is the case under UNICTAD’s definition, it excludes the mere sale or lease of goods from the 
ambit of TOT transactions. This will, in turn, subject the definition to similar critics. 
From the above discussion, one can discern the absence of consensus among different authorities on the 
definition of TOT. For the purpose of this paper, the functional definition of TOT shall be adapted. Hence, 
                                                          
1 Vivek Shukla, Technology Transfer Agreements in High-Tech Industries: A Competition Law Analysis (Project 
Report, 2013) 8, available at 
http://cci.gov.in/images/media/ResearchReports/Technology%20Transfer%20Agreements%20in%20High-
Tech%20Industries%20_A%20Competition%20Law%20Analysis.pdf  
2 David M. Haug, Supra note 4, at 212. 
3 Ibid. 
4                   , The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer in the Context of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity: A Technical Study, https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/ttc/egttstc-02/other/egttstc-02-oth-techstudy-en.pdf . 
5 Ibid. 
6 Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 18th Year No. 63, Art. 2 (10), (2012).  
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throughout this paper, TOT refers to the process by which a scientific knowledge, a technology or know-how is 
transferred from one person to another who will, as a result, acquire the capability to manufacture a good, render 
a service and improve a process whose qualities are comparable to that of the technology supplier’s products. 
Hence, TOT presupposes two parties: technology supplier and technology recipient.  Technology supplier is the 
party who made the technology available for a transfer to the technology receiver.  Whereas, the technology 
recipient is the party who acquires the technology with the view to manufacture a product, render a service or 
apply it on a process. 
 
1.2.  Methods of TOT 
Technology transfer can take place in different ways. this section is devised to briefly discuss the main channels 
of TOT. One of these mechanisms is FDI. The benefits of FDI to the host country may be of multifold. Empirical 
evidences suggest that “FDI triggers technology spillovers, assists human capital formation, contributes to 
international trade integration, helps create a more competitive business environment and enhances enterprise 
development.”1 With the view to maximize the benefits that may be derived from foreign presence in the 
domestic economy, developing countries have liberalized their FDI regime and introduced other policies to 
attract foreign investors. The question here is that how does FDI bring about technology transfer in to host 
countries.  
As a matter of fact, Transnational Corporations (TNCs), which are the main sources of FDI, are also the 
sources of world’s mature technology. These companies often invest in developing markets in order to "protect 
the existing market, to create new markets, to bypass prohibitive barriers and import restrictions, to take 
advantage of cheap labor and skills, and to discover or protect raw materials.”2 These benefits can best be 
fulfilled by retaining ownership and control of the technology transferred to a foreign market incident to an 
investment in that market.3 Put differently, multinationals have much to gain from preventing the diffusion of 
their technologies to local firms.4 In fact, TNCs are fully aware of the fact that “transferring the production 
technology to the foreign country would simply create unnecessary and unwanted competition and diminish 
profitability.”5 
Nonetheless, even in the presence of this restrictive practice, FDI carried out by TNCs remains to be 
one of the most important vehicles for TOT. To begin with, may benefit the host economy through the backward 
and forward linkages they generate.6  The suppliers of the TNCs may be local firms (backward linkages). In this 
case, TNCs will be forced to provide technical assistance, training and information to the local firms to raise the 
qualities of their supplier’s products.7 In this sense, the domestic affiliates of TNCs may acquire advanced 
technologies more directly and effectively with the assistance of the latter. The other way round, TNCs may also 
be suppliers of domestic firms (forward linkage). In these cases too, TNCs may assist users of their products to 
modernize or upgrade production facilities with the view to enable the latter to use more inputs.8 These activities, 
in the final analysis, will enable local firms to acquire and adopt advanced technologies.  Moreover, the vertical 
linkage between a foreign company and competing domestic forms may result in a fierce competition between/ 
among the domestic firms, which relates each other horizontally. With the view to supply quality products to 
foreign firms, these domestic firms may be forced to acquire and adopt new technologies and advance their 
managerial style. This phenomenon will necessarily bring about TOT in to the host country.  
Secondly, the presence of foreign firms may also force horizontally related domestic firms to access and 
adopt advanced foreign technologies. When TNCs decide to penetrate a new market directly through investing in 
a country, they tend to bring with them more sophisticated technology and superior managerial practices, and 
compete with local firms. The competition with TNCs may force domestic firms to increase their 
competitiveness by reforming management styles and updating production technology.9 This implies that FDI 
may bring about technology spillover because of its demonstration effects.10 It must, however, be noted that the 
                                                          
1 Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Foreign Direct Investment 
for Development: Maximizing Benefits, Minimizing (Costs Overview) 6 (2002 ), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf . 
2 David M. Haug, Supra note 4, at 215. 
3 Ibid.  
4 Kamal Saggi,  Trade, Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and International Technology Transfer: A Survey, 17 THE WORLD 
BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 191, 209 (2002). 
5 David M. Haug, Supra note 4, at  215. 
6 Kamal Saggi,  Supra note 17, at 212. 
7 United Nations, supra note 11, at 14.  
8 Kamal Saggi,  Supra note 17, at 212. 
9 Alper Sönmez & M. Teoman Pamukçu, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Spillovers in the Turkish Manufacturing 
Industry 10 (TEKPOL Working Paper Series 11, 2003).  
10 Kamal Saggi,  Supra note 4, at  209. 
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competition between TNCs and domestic firms may also bring about negative result. While competition between 
TNCs and domestic firms in the domestic economy is an incentive for the domestic firms to make a more 
efficient use of existing resources and technology or even to adopt new technologies, it may restrict the market 
power of domestic firms.1   
In addition, the presence of advanced technology users in domestic markets may reduce the cost of 
technology imitation and innovation. Domestic firms may hesitate to bear the cost of acquiring knowledge and 
fear the uncertainties of the result that may be obtained from the acquired technology. However, when domestic 
firms observe how TNC’s affiliates adopt product innovation or a new form of organization to local conditions, 
they may be initiated to attempt the innovation.  In this regard a certain writer asserted that “[technology transfer] 
take place when domestic firms improve their efficiency by copying technologies of foreign affiliates operating 
in the domestic market via the observation channel.”2 To put in slightly different word, since the interaction of 
domestic forms with new technology user TNC affiliates reduces uncertainties and result in diffusion of 
information, the presence of foreign firms encourages domestic firms to acquire and adopt new technologies 
through imitation. This observation effect of FDI mainly works among firms which belong to same industrial 
sector.3 
Thirdly, the presence of TNCs may bring about technology transfer through labor mobility. The idea 
here is that the presence of TNCs crates the possibility of hiring workers previously employed in TNCs and who 
have knowledge and experience of the technology and who are able to apply their knowledge and experience in 
domestic firms.4 These workers may also set up their own new entrepreneur business and apply the knowledge 
and skill they acquired while they were in TNCs. It is to assert that workers trained or previously employed by 
multinationals may transfer important information to local firms by switching employers or may contribute to 
technology diffusion by starting their own firms.5 
At this juncture, it must not be left unmentioned that this channel of technology transfer, i.e., TOT 
through labour mobility, has a possible negative impact. That is, “TNCs may attract the best workers away from 
domestic firms by offering higher wages and leaving them with less-skilled employees.”6 
The other most important channel of TOT is turnkey package. Under the turn key package method of 
TOT, a foreign company provides machinery, buildings, management, expertise, and production plan. 7 The 
technology supplier’s responsibility is the execution of the total work, including developing the industrial 
complex, its design, procurement of equipments and engineers, construction works and initiate operation of the 
plant. The involvement of the technology recipient is limited to providing capital and site for the project.8 What 
the technology recipient further required to do is watch up to the plant and turns the key- that is why this type of 
arrangement is known by the name “turn-key”.9 
As indicted above, in the turn key arrangement of technology transfer, the obligation of the technology 
supplier is limited to ensuring that the plant will function properly. Post start up performance of the plant and the 
training of local personnel is usually outside the technology supplier’s responsibility.10 As a result, in many 
instances, after the plant has been completed and delivered by the technology supplier, technology recipients 
encounter serious difficulties in properly running and maintaining the plant.11 To avoid this problem, technology 
recipients should insist to hold the technology supplier responsible for an initial management for a reasonable 
period of time and to train local personnel during the bargaining process. 12 Even in cases of such type of 
                                                          
1 Alper Sönmez & M. Teoman Pamukçu, Supra note 22, at 10. “The efficiency of domestic firms may ... be negatively 
affected through this channel, if foreign firms with advanced technologies produce at a lower marginal cost. By taking market 
share from domestic firms and forcing them to operate on a less efficient scale, with a consequent increase of their average 
costs, TNCs may lower the productivity of domestic firms.” 
2 Dominique Foray, Technology Transfer in the TRIPS Age: The Need for New Types of Partnerships between the Least 
Developed and Most Advanced Economies 8 (ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper No.23, 
May 2009), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/New%202009/foray_may2009.pdf 
3 Ibid. 
4 Id, at 8-9. 
5 Kamal Saggi,  Supra note 17, at 209.  
6 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), supra note 14, at 9. 
7 David M. Haug, Supra note 4, 215.  
8 Joseph Kunkuta, Technology  and the Legal Framework of its Transfer in Zambia 86 (1990) (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Zambia, Faculity of Law).  
9 David M. Haug, Supra note 4, at 215. 
10 Joseph Kunkuta, Supra note 31, at 83. 
11 Ibid. 
12 John H. Barton, New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for National and International Policy 25 (ICTSD 
Intellectual Property and Sustainable Development Series Issue Paper No. 18, February 2007), available at  
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/Barton%20%20New%20Trends%20Technology%20Transfer%200207.pdf .  (In 
fact, this latter arrangement is called ““Build Operate Transfer” (BOT) approach in which an international firm builds the 
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arrangement, another big problem remains with turnkey contracts. Technology suppliers sale the entire 
technology package, giving the technology recipient no opportunity to select only the parts of that package that 
they actually needed.1 
Technology licensing is also one of the main channels through which technology flows from one 
country to another. It can be described as the transfer of technology for compensation.2  It involves the purchase 
of production rights which are protected by IP rights and, in many cases, the provision of technical assistance 
and know-how which are needed to adapt and adopt the technology.3 As such, it includes patent licensing, TOT 
agreements and technical assistance agreements.   
Literatures assert that, as technology licensing is the most versatile method of TOT as compared to 
other methods, it is a method of transfer both technology suppliers and recipients favor. From the perspective of 
technology recipients, technology licensing offers flexibility in technology choice and an opportunity for the 
source and the receiving institution to negotiate.4 With respect to the technology supplier, technology licensing 
agreements also enable the technology licensor to reap profits from the TOT without risking capital in a 
sometimes volatile foreign market.5 
Joint venture investments are the other important methods of TOT. Joint ventures are long-term 
contractual relationships involving the pooling of assets, joint management, profit and risk sharing, joint 
marketing, servicing, and production.6 In such type of contractual arrangements, each party is supposed to 
provide some advantage that reduces the cost of joint operation.7 
Joint venture as an international TOT mechanism involves a partnership between local investors and 
foreign investors in which the foreign investor supplies technology in addition to or instead of mere monetary 
contribution. This is to assert that technology may be an equity contribution of a foreign partner to the joint 
venture.8 Hence, in Joint venture arrangements, the foreign investor will make new technology available while 
the domestic firm provides its knowledge of the market, the regulatory and business environment, and some 
other local advantages.9 
Joint venture as a mechanism of technology transfer has some advantages. In cases of TOT through 
joint venture, the transfer of technology is the main operation, thereby, conferring the advantages thereof. That is, 
there will be a relative optimal decision making as decision makings concerning the choice of technology and 
learning process rests on local agents. The other advantage is that, since all parties, including the technology 
supplier, wants to see the venture succeed, there will be equal commitments to the technology transfer to take 
place at a rapid pace. In addition, from the perspective of developing countries, joint venture enterprises would 
be very essential where the technology under consideration is too sophisticated for a developing country to 
produce and operate it by itself.10 Because of these benefits of joint venture, many countries have expressed a 
preference for joint ventures, with the foreign partner in a minority position, over wholly FDI.11 The investment 
laws of some countries even oblige the foreign partner to contribute some sort of technology to the joint 
venture.12  
International trade is also plays significant role in TOT.  As discussed under section 1.1. above, while 
defining TOT, some authorities, including the Ethiopian investment law, exclude mere sale or lease of goods 
from the ambit of TOT transactions. On the contrary, some literatures recognize the trade in goods and services 
as a channel for international TOT provided that the purchased equipment is not commercially available in the 
recipient country.13 According to the proponents of this assertion “[t]rade as a channel for TT involves imports 
of goods and services — especially capital goods and high tech products – and export by firms from developed 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
plant, operates it for a period in order to gain the income to pay for the plant’s construction, and then transfers it to the 
developing nation.”) 
1 David M. Haug, Supra note 4, at 215. 
2  Farok J. Contractor, INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY LICENSING: COMPENSATION, COSTS AND 
NEGOTIATION 3 (1981) 
3 Dominique Foray, supra note 25, at 35. 
4 David M. Haug, supra note 4, at 215. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Id, at 216. 
7 Dominique Foray, Supra note 25, at 34. 
8 Richard J. Goossen, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: LAW AND PRACTICE 8 
(1987). 
9 Dominique Foray, Supra note 25, at 34. 
10 C.G. Weeramantry, Human Rights, Technology, and Development , in 151 HUMAN RIGHTS AND SCIENTIFIC AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 161 (C.G. Weeramantry ed., 1990). 
11 Dominique Foray, Supra note 25, at 35. 
12 John H. Barton, Supra note 35, at 37. 
13 Maria Anna Corvaglia , South–South Technology Transfer Addressing Climate Change 7, available at http://www.nccr-
climate.unibe.ch/conferences/climate_economics_law/papers/Corvaglia_MariaAnna.pdf    
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countries to lesser developed countries.”1  
In fact, the import of high- tech products and capital goods may foster local invention and technological 
capability through reveres engineering of the imported goods. By the same taken, exporting of goods creates an 
opportunity for local firms to participate in the global supply chain. As a result, these firms will benefit from 
numerous training and technological spillover effects from their customers.2 Understood in this sense, import 
and export of high – tech goods can be taken as one mechanism of TOT, though an indirect one.  
In addition to import and export of high tech goods, sub-contracting is another indirect form of trade 
related TOT.3 Since the sub contractor manufactures the final product under the principal’s brand name, the 
quality, delivery, and price of the final product are critical for the foreign investor. These concerns are likely to 
generate long term technical relationships for capacity building in the host country. As such, substantial learning 
may take place.  
Hence, one can conclude that trade in high tech goods can be taken as one interesting mechanism of 
TOT in to a country. Nonetheless, it is important to note the limitations of TOT that may take place through this 
arrangement. For instance, in cases of subcontracting, it is difficult for the sub-contracting company to establish 
international brand images as it sells the final products in the principal’s brand name. The dependency of local 
firms on foreign companies for technologies and components may also persist for a long time.4 
In general, the commercial transfer and acquisition of technology can take place with the sale and 
purchase of equipment and other capital goods.  Sales and purchases of capital goods and their import into the 
country can be considered, in a sense, technology transfers transactions.5 
Commercial transfer of technology may also take place in connection with the system of franchising of 
goods and services.  A franchise or distributorship is a business arrangement whereby the reputation, technical 
information and expertise of one party are combined with the investment of another party for the purpose of 
selling goods or rendering services directly to the consumer.6  The outlet for the marketing of such goods and 
services is usually based on a trademark or service mark or a trade name and a special décor (the “look”) or 
design of the premises.7  The license of such a mark or name by its owner is normally combined with the supply 
by that owner of know-how in some form, either technical information, technical services, technical assistance or 
management services concerning production, marketing, maintenance and administration.8 
It must, however, be noted that all franchise agreements are not technology transfer agreements. What 
counts as a transfer of technology within the context of a franchise agreement is tricky and requires a close 
review of the type and nature of the specific franchising agreement.  
Broadly speaking, there are three types of franchising; trade name franchise, product distribution 
franchise and pure franchise.9 In trade name franchising, the franchisee purchases the right to become identified 
with the franchisers trade name.10 In such type of franchising, the franchisor may provide minimal assistance to 
the franchisee. As a result, there might not be a TOT component in the franchising relationship of the parties. 
Yet, if the trade mark licensing is coupled with the provision of extensive technical assistance, trade mark 
franchising may still be considered as TOT arrangement. In fact, in some jurisdictions, a simple trademark 
license is usually not a franchise if: the business of the licensee doesn’t substantially associate with licensor’s 
marketing plan or business system; the licensor does not have significant control over licensee’s business or the 
licensor does not provide significant assistance to the licensee.11  
In the Ethiopian legal system, the trademark law requires parties to a trademark licensing agreement to 
insert a provision in the agreement to the effect that the licensor shall have effective control over the quality of 
the goods and services of the licensee. 12  This stipulation, however, will not make all trademark licensing 
                                                          
1 Dominique Foray, Supra note 25, at 32. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Id, at 33. Subcontracting is a contractual arrangement “whereby the subcontractor manufactures the final product under the 
principal’s brand name. This allows foreign involvement without the transfer of ownership. Such an arrangement often 
involves the foreign partner in selecting capital equipment, training managers, engineers and technicians, and advising on 
production, financing, and management.”  
4 Ibid. 
5 World Intellectual Property Organization, Overview of Contractual Agreements for  the Transfer of Technology, 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/sme/en/documents/pdf/technology_transfer.pdf  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid.  
9             , Types of Franchising,  https://www.boundless.com/business/textbooks/boundless-businesstextbook/types-of-
business-ownership-6/franchising-52/types-of-franchises-257-1725/  
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Trade Mark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/ 2006, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 12th Year No. 37, 
Art 30, (2006) 
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agreements franchising arrangements. In addition to controlling, the licensor should have the obligation to 
provide technical and other assistances. The licensee should also have the right to use, inter alia, the business 
operation model and marketing strategy of the licensor under the agreement.  
Product distribution franchise licenses the franchisee to sell specific products under the manufacturer’s 
brand name and trademark through a selective, limited distribution network. 1  This type of franchising 
agreements are suitable to lower to medium size investments whereby the franchisee sells and/or distributes 
products or services in his/her/its territory.2 These types of franchising agreements involve TOT if the franchisor 
has the duty to transfer his/her/its marketing technology to the franchisee.  
Pure (or comprehensive or business format) franchise provides the franchisee with a complete business 
format, including a license for a trade name, the products or services to be sold, the physical plant, the methods 
of operation, a marketing strategy plan, a quality control process, and the necessary business services.3 It is needs 
to assert that pure franchising always involve TOT.  
In general, it is only franchise agreements that involve the authorization of the use of marketing 
technology, management, and proprietary business process, and/or specified machines that could be used for the 
production of goods or for rendering of a service which are one mode of TOT. 
 
1.3. Restrictive Conditions in Technology Transfer Agreements 
As explained under the preceding section, TOT agreements are the main form of market based technology 
transfer mechanisms.   Different studies indicate that such type of agreements are often subject to restrictive 
clauses and conditions which, in varying degrees, limit developing countries’ access to technology.4 As a result, 
the TOT regulatory system of these countries prohibits the inclusion of such type of terms and conditions in TOT 
agreements. The present section is devised to briefly explain the most common types of restrictive terms and 
conditions. 
1.3.1. Tie- Ins 
Tie-Ins clauses are terms and conditions which restrict the source of supply of inputs. These terms restrict the 
technology recipient’s choice to purchase intermediate goods, capital equipments, spare parts and even experts.5 
Under TOT agreements which contain Tie-ins clauses, the technology recipient is required to obtain equipment, 
tools, spare parts or raw materials exclusively from the technology supplier or a designated source specified by 
the latter even if the inputs are available at a competitive price in domestic market.6  “An inevitable effect of 
these tie-ins is to prevent the technology acquirer from obtaining these ancillary goods and services from the 
most competitive sources of supply.”7 
In addition to restricting technology spillover, Tie-ins clauses have other multifold implications for 
technology recipients. They deprived of technology recipients the possibility of exploiting market opportunities. 
In addition, by reason of their exclusive position, technology suppliers may charge higher prices than the price of 
comparable equipment and other inputs that could otherwise be obtained elsewhere.8 Overpricing of inputs in 
this way constitutes a 'hidden' cost of the transfer of technology process.9 It may also be added that the structure 
of the market for intermediate and other inputs which are tied to the sources of technology by the technology 
supplier has implied an increasing dependence on imports of capital goods and intermediate outputs. 10 This 
creates a perpetual dependency relationship between the technology suppler and recipient, and thus makes little 
room for freedom of action by the latter.11   Furthermore, tin-ins clauses are anti- competitive.  
1.3.2. Export Restrictions  
The other most common category of restrictive terms and conditions are clauses which prohibit or limit export of 
the goods and services produced by the technology recipient. These terms and conditions take various forms. 
They may range from “express total prohibitions on exports, through permissible exports of designated products 
                                                          
1                , supra note 57. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Bernard M. Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus   & Kamal Saggi, Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and 
Multilateral Policy Options 22 (Working Paper, 2004), available at 
http://www.betsaonline.com/SystemAnalysis/TransferTechnology.pdf . 
5 Id, at 23. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 George Sipa-Mjah Yankey, George Sipa-Mjah Yankey, The Role of the International Patent System in the Transfer of 
Technology to West Africa: Case Studies- Ghana and Nigeria 56 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, the University of 
Warwick), available at http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/39315 . 
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11 Ibid.  
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.55, 2016 
 
155 
to designated markets, and to market share arrangements implied between parent and subsidiary enterprises.”1 
The obvious impact of this type of restrictions is hampering the growth and competitiveness of the technology 
recipients industry. This will, in turn, compel the technology recipient to maintain production at a minimum level. 
Consequently, it will not fully exploit the foreign technology. It may also be discouraged to in invest new 
production facilities.2   
1.3.3. Competition Restrictions 
TOT agreements often contain provisions which prohibit the technology recipient from the use of other 
competitive techniques. Such type of clause may also prohibit the technology recipient the use of complimentary 
technology. These categories of terms and conditions have the effect of limiting the range of technology and 
sources of technologies available to the technology recipient.3 They may also prevent the adaptation of the 
technology to suit local market needs.  
1.3.4. R & D Restrictions 
TOT agreements may also contain clauses which impose restriction on research and development activities of 
the technology recipient in connection with the technology transferred. Such type of clauses may have the effect 
of preventing the adaptation and modification of the transferred technology to accord to local situations and to be 
appropriate for local consumption.4  They may also hamper incremental innovation.  
1.3.5. Quota Restriction  
Quota retractions are the other typical restrictive terms and conditions in TOT agreements. TOT agreements may 
contain a provision which limit the volume of production or sale of a product produced by the technology 
recipient. These types of provisions have negative effect on the optimal utilization of the transferred technology 
by the technology recipient. They may also have adverse effect on the competitiveness of the technology 
recipient.  
In general, restrictive terms and conditions have negative impact on technology recipient countries’ 
desire to access and adapt foreign technologies, and develop local technological capability.  They also have 
negative effect on their firms’ competiveness in the international market in one way or another. As a result, the 
TOT regulatory system of most developing countries prohibits their inclusion.  
 
2. Regulation of TOT at the International Arena 
History tells that today’s advanced countries have built their technological capacity by imitating foreign 
technologies in a protected market. The present developing countries cannot follow the same path to acquire new 
technologies.5 As a result of adaption of international IPR protection agreements, it becomes legally difficult to 
imitate foreign technologies. In addition, because of free trade rules, an indigenous firm in the developing world 
may not be able to begin through a protected market as, for instance, the US industrial firms of the early 19th 
century did.6 This in turn demands the analysis of international agreements that relate with TOT.  
 
2.1. The International Law on Intellectual Property Rights and TOT 
The international law on intellectual property is mainly consists of the Bern convention, the Paris Convention 
and the TRIPS Agreement. These agreements are primarily standard setting instruments. As such, they aim to 
provide a balance between the rights and obligations of the IPR owner of a work and the potential users of that 
work. The implementation of the standards set forth in these instruments is also relied on national measures. 
Meaning, parties to the agreements need to promulgate IPRs protection legislations that meet the minimum 
standards set in the agreements.    
As far as TOT is concerned, international IPRs protection agreements contain provisions which directly 
or indirectly relate to the diffusion of technologies from the global north to the developing south. Under this 
section, an attempt will be made to explain how some provisions of international agreements on intellectual 
property protections relate, directly or indirectly, to the transfer of technology from developed countries to 
developing ones. A particular emphasis, however, will be given to the TRIPs Agreement as the remaining 
agreements are incorporated in to it by reference and it has effective implementation mechanism. It is also the 
TRIPs Agreement that has directly and explicitly dealt with the issue of TOT.  
 
                                                          
1 Bernard M. Hoekman, Keith E. Maskus   & Kamal Saggi, Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Unilateral and 
Multilateral Policy Options 23 (Working Paper, 2004), available at 
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2 George Sipa-Mjah Yankey, Supra note 64, at 51. 
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2.1.1. The Paris  Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property  
Since its adoption, the Paris convention has gone through various revisions. Particularly, the idea of revising the 
convention to include additional provisions of special benefit to developing countries was favored in 1974.1 The 
group which was in charge of revising the convention adopted at that time a declaration of the objectives of the 
revision. One of these objectives was the development of technology by developing countries and the 
improvement of the conditions for the transfer of technology in to developing countries under fair and reasonable 
terms.  
Despite the relentless efforts of developing countries to revise the provisions of the Paris Convention 
which affect them most, due to the fierce resistance of developed countries, the provisions of the convention 
fundamentally remains the same. Below, technology transfer related provisions of the convention will be 
explained.  
A. The Principle of National Treatment (Art. 2) 
The essence of the principle of national treatment is that nationals of the country under consideration and foreign 
nationals have to be treated alike. By the same parlance, the Paris Convention disallows member countries of the 
union from discriminating patent applicants and owners who are nationals of the union. Art. 2 (1) of the 
convention reads:  
“Nationals of any country of the Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, 
enjoy in all the other countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now 
grant, or may hereafter grant, to nationals; all without prejudice to the rights specially 
provided for by this Convention. Consequently, they shall have the same protection as the 
latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided that the 
conditions and formalities imposed upon nationals are complied with.”2  
The above quoted provision entitles nationals of the union to enjoy same right as nationals of the other 
union may drive from their domestic patent laws. Put differently, by virtue of the principle of national treatment 
of the Paris Convention, foreigners and nationals are equal before the patent jurisdiction of a granting member 
country so long as the foreign patent applicant complied with the conditions and formalities that are imposed on 
the nationals of the host country. This implies that no matter the level of underdevelopment and scientific and 
technological capability, a member country cannot discriminate in favor of its nationals as a means of 
encouraging indigenous inventiveness and initiative, including TOT.3  
Formal equality as provided for by Art. 2 would operate to the mutual advantage of the convention 
countries had they were either at or almost at the same level of technological and economic development. In face 
of the present immense diversity in technological capabilities between the developed and the less developed 
member countries, the principle would simply be against the interest of developing countries and confer more 
benefit to developed countries.4  
The above is not, nonetheless, to conclude that the principle of national treatment has only negative 
implication on developing countries. Seen from the perspective of TOT, as a result of the principle of national 
treatment, foreign inventors may be encouraged to apply for patent protection and license their right to exploit 
the invention to local firms if the patent system of the host country seem advantageous to them. This may give an 
opportunity to local firms to acquire new technologies. The acquisition of new technology by local firms may, in 
turn, result in the diffusion of the technology throughout the host country.  
In addition, as stipulated under Art. 2 (1) of the Paris Convention, a foreign inventor who seek to get 
patent right protection in another country is required to fulfill the conditions and formalities imposed on the 
nationals of the host country. One of the most common condition for the grant of patent right protection under 
the domestic law of most, if not all, countries is industrial application of the invention. As a result, it is presumed 
that inventors apply for patent protection whenever they intend to exploit the invention in the host country. 
Obviously, the industrial application of a patented invention has a positive implication on the spillover of 
technology in to the host country. To explain this point a little bit, the industrial application of the invention may 
enforce the inventor to employ local personnel. These local employees may acquire the know-how to operate the 
invention.  In the long term, when the invention enters in the public domain, these employees may establish their 
own business and use the know-how they acquired from their previous employer. This, in turn, may ease the 
effort of the host country to adopt and implement foreign technologies.  
Moreover, if the patent right owner fails to industrially exploit the patented invention in the host 
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country, the invention may be a subject of compulsory licenses under the domestic law of the host country. A 
compulsory license may also be granted to an inventor whose invention cannot he worked effectively without the 
invention of the foreigner. For same reasons mentioned above, the application of the invention as a result of a 
grant of compulsory license may bring about technology diffusion to the host country.  
Furthermore, as it is the case with other rights, domestic laws subject patent rights to various limitations. 
Among other thing, interested parties of the host country can use the patented invention freely for non-
commercial, scientific and research purposes. The use of the patented invention for these purposes may build the 
technological capability of the host country.   
B. Protection of Imported Products Manufactured by a Process in the Importing Country  
The Paris convention contains various provisions which entitle a patentee to import monopoly. One of these 
provisions is Art. 5 quarter. This provision stipulates:  
“When a product is imported into a country of the Union where there exists a patent protecting 
a process of manufacture of the said product, the patentee shall have all the rights, with 
regard to the imported product, that are accorded to him by the legislation of the country of 
importation, on the basis of the process patent, with respect to products manufactured in that 
country.”1 
The above quoted provision entitles a patentee of a patented process of manufacture to enjoy same right 
as a patentee who manufacture a product in the host country using a patented process of manufacture, though the 
former manufacture the products in other countries. This stipulation may encourage patentees to manufacture 
their produces abroad and import in to the host country. Such type of activities undermine developing countries’ 
effort to build their technological capability through the local workings of patented invention as, as far as TOT is 
concerned, local working of patents cannot be substituted for the importation of patented products for these 
countries. In fact, though import is useful conduit of TOT, the stand of developing countries against import is so 
strong that they do not recognize it as a medium of technology transfer.2  
Hence, it is possible to assert that Art. 5 quarter of the Paris Convention undermines the effort of 
developing countries to acquire new technologies through the local working of patented processes of 
manufacture. In addition, since, in practical terms, if patentees do not exploit their patented process of 
manufacture within the territory of developing countries, Art. 5 quarter entails acceptance of import monopoly if 
sale and use privileges are present, as it is almost always the case, in their national legislation.3 These negative 
effects of the above provision clearly suggest that developing countries do not derive any merit from the 
sustenance of this provision.4 It rather negatively affect the countries’ effort to acquire new technologies.  
C. Protection Against Unfair Competition 
The Paris Convention bound state parties of the Union to assure national of the Union effective protection 
against unfair competition. 5  The convention further lists down acts that constitute unfair competition and, 
thereby, need to be prohibited by national legislations. In particular, Art 10bis (3) (1) provides that state parties 
of the union shall prohibit “all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by any means whatever with the 
establishment, the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities of a competitor.”6 As this stipulation, state 
parties of the Union are obliged to prohibit all acts of such a nature that may create confusion with, inter alia, the 
goods, commercial or industrial activity of a competitor. Seen from the perspective of TOT, the provision clearly 
outlaws any attempt to imitate the goods or commercial activity of a foreign company as imitation obviously 
creates confusion. This implies that the provision closes the door for transfer of technology through imitation.  
D. The Compulsory License Regime  
A “compulsory license” is an authorization given by a national authority to a person without or against the 
consent of the title holder for the exploitation of a subject matter protected by a patent or other IPR.7 Yet, this 
authorization may not be given arbitrarily. Compulsory license is normally granted to a third party up on the 
fulfillment of certain grounds. The most common grounds for the grant of compulsory license are failure to work 
or insufficient working before the expiration a specific years from the date of application for the patent, or from 
the date of the grant of the patent whichever period expires last. 8  Even if these grounds are fulfilled, a 
compulsory license may not be grated to a third party if the title holder justifies his/her inaction by "legitimate 
                                                          
1 Paris Convention, Supra note 79, Art. 5quarter.  
2 George Sipa-Mjah Yankey, Supra note 68, at 103. 
3 Id, at 104. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Paris Convention, Supra note 79, Art. 10bis (1). 
6 Id, Art. 10bis (3) (1). 
7 Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights and the Use of Compulsory Licenses: Options for Developing Countries 11 
(South Centre Working Papers No. 5, October 1999), available at 
http://www.iatp.org/files/Intellectual_Property_Rights_and_the_Use_of_Co.pdf . 
8 Ibid. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.55, 2016 
 
158 
reasons".1 
The Paris convention recognizes the right of state parties the Union to grant of compulsory license to 
third parties under Art. 5A (2). As per this provision, state parties of the convention have the right to grant 
compulsory license to prevent abuse of patent right.   The whole text of this sub-Article reads:    
“Each country of the Union shall have the right to take legislative measures providing for the 
grant of compulsory licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the exercise of the 
exclusive rights conferred by the patent, for example, failure to work.”2 
Now days, it is hardly possible to find a country which doesn’t enact legislation which provide for the 
grant of compulsory license.  It is to assert that almost all national patent laws stipulate the grounds up on the 
fulfillment of which a compulsory license may be granted. Obviously, the most dominant ground up on the 
fulfillment which compulsory license may be granted to a third party is non-working and insufficient working of 
the invention in the host country. Such type of stipulations inevitably urges the patent right holder to sufficiently 
work the invention. In case he/she fails to sufficiently work the patented invention, the concerned authority may 
grant compulsory license to a third party who may apply to exploit the invention. This implies that the possibility 
by which a patented invention may be industrially applied in the host country by either the right holder or a third 
party, in case the former fails to do so, is very high. The exploitation of a patented technology, whether by the 
patent right holder or a third party, in the host country will, in turn, result is the diffusion of technology in to the 
host country.  
Nonetheless, the utility of the compulsory license regime of the Paris Convention to developing 
countries endeavor to acquire foreign technology is minimal for various reasons. Firstly, developing countries’ 
firms haven’t the required technological capability to industrially apply new inventions. As a matter of fact, only 
a small proportion of patented inventions are directly worked in developing countries. Theoretically speaking, 
this problem of non- working of patented inventions should have been addressed by compulsory license. 
Contrary to this logical inference, developing countries’ firms do not require for the grant of compulsory license 
due to, inter alia, lack of technical capability to apply new inventions. As a result, the compulsory license 
procedure of developing countries remains to play little importance for inward flow of technology.  
Secondly, even from theoretical point of view, some of the preconditions that have to be fulfilled for the 
grant of compulsory license are excessively strange. In this regard, Art. 5A (4) can be mentioned by way of 
example. This provisos states: 
“A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient 
working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent 
application or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires 
last; it shall be refused if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a 
compulsory license shall be non–exclusive and shall not be transferable, even in the form of 
the grant of a sub–license, except with that part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits 
such license.”3 
The strict application of the above stipulation will likely prolong the time required to obtain a 
compulsory license more than the period indicated in the prevision. This may particularly be the case especially 
where prior examination of the substance is required before the grant of the license.  As a result, compulsory 
license is neither used nor easily available to developing countries’ firms. In fact, empirical evidences suggest 
that the compulsory license as a legal remedy for the abuse of patent protection in developing countries 
(especially LDCs) is almost non- existent due to insufficient indigenous technological capability.4  
To sum up this section, some provisions of the Paris Convention have their own bearing the movement 
of technology from  developed to developing countries. But, for the most part, these provisos do not crate 
conducive environment for TOT. Accordingly, there are scholars who conclude that developing countries, 
especially LDCs, do not drive any significant benefit from the international patent system, especially as regards 
technology transfer.5  
2.1.2. The TRIPS Agreement  
As explained above, the Paris Convention doesn’t provide any significant benefits to LDCs as far as their desire 
to technology acquisition is concerned. As a result, some scholars have gone to the extent of suggesting that 
developing countries should abandon the international patent system.6 However, while LDCs do accept the view 
that the cost involved in their participation in the international patent system greatly outweighs the benefits, they 
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do not, at least by their continuing participation, seem to sympathized with the idea of abandonment. Instead 
they have so far preferred the revision of those provisions of the convention which had adverse effects on their 
economic development.1 
In various rounds for the revision of the Paris Convention, developing countries set the acceleration of 
development of their technological capability and improving the conditions for the transfer of technology in to 
their territory as one objective of the revision. By 1986, the negotiation between developed and developing 
countries over the revision of the Paris Conversion was dead locked at the WIPO. It is in this crucial time that 
the ministerial conference of GATT comes in to picture.  
During the Uruguay round of negotiation, the GATT contracting parties have set out the objectives of 
their negotiation. One of these objectives was the establishment of a new multinational IP agreement. In the 
beginning, most developing countries were opposing the discussion on IPRs issues within the realm of GATT. 
The claim of these countries was that only the WIPO had the institutional competency to IPRs issues. However, 
this claim was rejected for various reasons and by the early 1990s, virtually all negotiating parties accepted as 
inevitable the inclusion of minimum standards for intellectual property protection and enforcement in the GATT 
framework.2 In describing the reasons for this change of attitude, a certain writer put: 
“Such a change of attitude was largely the result of the United States’ aggressive strategies 
toward the hardliner opposition countries, its successful ‘divide and conquer’ tactics, the 
economic crises confronting many of these countries, and the successful lobbying of the 
European Communities, Japan, and the United States by global intellectual property industries. 
By the time Canada proposed to create a new multilateral trade organization in October 1990, 
its proposal, along with the less developed countries’ fears of being excluded from such an 
organization, ‘effectively ended the debate on the earlier developing country position of WIPO 
as the appropriate forum for lodging the results of the TRIPS negotiations’.”3 
Thereafter, the negotiating parties embarked on discussing the terms and conditions of the TRIPS 
Agreement. At the beginning of the TRIPS negotiation, developing countries primarily focused on resisting the 
inclusion of new standards for the protection and enforce of IPRs in the GATT. However, they soon realized that 
they were fighting a lose battle. Accordingly, they began to insist on linking intellectual property protection to 
the promotion of social, economic and technological development. 4 
With the view to advance their concerns like other interest groups, developing countries proposed their 
own draft text during the TRIPS negotiation.5 The concerns of developing countries as stated under this draft are 
finally incorporated under Art.7 and Art.8 of the TRIPS Agreement. That is, the contents of these provisions are 
derived from Art.2 of the draft text of developing countries to the TRIPS Agreement.  
Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the TRIPS Agreement provide for the objectives and principles of the agreement. 
Close reading of these provisions indicates that the objectives and principles of the TRIPS Agreement mainly 
focus on technology development and transfer related issues. In fact, the objectives of Article 7 focus 
significantly on technology-related intellectual property rights.6  
Apart from Art. 7 and Art 8, as indicated above, the TRIPS Agreement has also devoted a specific 
provision that imposes positive obligation on developed countries to encourage their companies and institutions 
to transfer technology to WTO member LDCs. This obligation is enshrined under Art. 66 (2) of the agreement. 
Seen from face value of the above discussion, it seems a paramount place is given to TOT under the 
TRIPS Agreement. Herein under, the essence and utilities of the above mentioned provisions will be analyzed to 
ascertain whether the TRIPS Agreement put in place a favorable legal environment for the flow of technology 
from developed to developing countries.  
I. The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement and TOT 
As discussed above, the objectives of the TRIPS Agreement are enshrined under Art. 7 of the agreement. This 
provision reads:  
“The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to 
the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
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conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.”1 
From the above quoted provision, it is possible to pin point the objectives of protecting and enforcing IPRs with 
the WTO structure. These objectives are:  
1. Promoting technological innovation; 
2. Transferring and disseminating technology; 
3. Striking a balance between the interest of producers and users of technological knowledge; 
4. Promoting social and economic welfare; and  
5. Striking “a balance of rights and obligations”. 
The first three objectives— technological innovation, the transfer and dissemination of technology, and the 
production and use of technological knowledge— emphasize significantly on technology-related intellectual 
property rights. A certain writer explains the reasons for this over emphasis on technology- related issues as 
follows:  
“This imbalance [in the focus] is possibly attributable to developing countries’ preoccupation 
about the impact of higher standards of IPR protection on the access to innovations and the 
products and services derived there from. Negotiations on issues not directly related to access 
to and use of technology were overall less controversial between the North and the South, 
while they often created considerable tensions between developed countries themselves.”2 
The drafting history of the TRIPS Agreement also confirms the above assertion. As indicated above, 
during the TRIPS negotiation, developing countries had advanced their own draft text for consideration. Art. 7 of 
the TRIPS Agreement simply adopted Art 2(2) and Art. 2(3) of this draft text. Since developing countries were 
deeply aware of their weakness in generating new science and technology, they feared that stronger intellectual 
property protection ‘would give too much power to title-holders and limit access to, and transfer of, technology.3 
Hence, they wanted any negotiation on intellectual property rights to take in to account their special needs.  This 
concern of developing countries essentially explains the over emphasis of Art. 7 of the agreement on technology- 
related issues of IPRs.  At any rate, from the above discussion, one can note the paramount importance attached 
to TOT under Art 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.  
Coming to the practical utility of Art. 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, the importance of the objectives of 
the TRIPS Agreement, as enshrined under Art 7, is controversial. From the stand point of treaty interpretation, 
Art. 7 is a “should” provision, as compared to a “shall” provision. This word choice has led some to argue that 
the provision is a mere hortatory one.4 Others, on the other hand, having regard to the location of the provision, 
discarded this argument. In this regard, a certain scholar noted that ‘[t]he fact that a provision of this nature is 
contained in the body of the agreement, and not in the preamble, would seem to heighten its status.’5 
This latter view is supported by various decisions of the WTO Appellate Body. Furthermore, since 
provisions of a treaty are intended to establish rights and obligations, Art. 7 of the TRIPS Agreement inevitably 
carries grater wait in the process of interpretation and implementation of the agreement. This implies that the 
objectives of the TRIPS Agreement have grater wait than general statements of intent as usually expressed in the 
preamble of a treaty. 6  Hence, the first three objectives listed above provide support to, inter alia,  those 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement that outline the obligations of developed countries to promote technology 
transfer, technical cooperation, and legal assistance.7 
From the perspective of policy development, Art. 7 has greater utility. The provision makes it clear that 
IPRs protections are not an end in themselves. It provides room for member countries to formulate IP policy 
which stick a balance between IPRs protection and other public needs. For instance, the third objective 
highlights the equal importance of both producers and users of technological knowledge. It therefore makes a 
strong case that exceptions and limitations in the TRIPS Agreement should be treated as important as the rights 
provided in the Agreement.8 
In general, from the above discussion it is possible to infer that the objectives of the TRIPs Agreement 
focus on technology- related IPRs protection. This over emphasis on technology-related IPRs protection is 
attributable to developing countries concern during the TRIPs negotiation that stronger IPR protection may 
undermine their endeavor to build their technological capability and competitiveness.  
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The inclusion a provisions that deals with the objectives of a treaty in its body, not only in the preamble, 
not only heightens the status of the objectives. It also enables that provision to play a paramount importance in 
the course of the interpretation of the treaty and policy development. This can also be inferred from the various 
decisions rendered by the WTO dispute settlement bodies as regards Art. 7 of the TRIPs Agreement. As such, 
this provision provides for rooms for flexibility to formulate IP policies and laws that facilitate access and 
adoption of technologies.  
Coming to the essence and utilities of the principles of the TRIPs Agreement, the interpretative and 
normative principles of the Agreement are enshrined under Art. 8. Sub. Art. 1 of this provision reads as follows. 
“Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt measures 
necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors 
of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such 
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement.”1   
This provision authorizes state parties to the agreement to formulate laws and regulations that promote, 
inter alia, their technological development. As such, part of the above stipulation normally echoes the Preamble 
of the TRIPs Agreement. The relevant part of the preamble of the agreement states that parties to the treaty enter 
in to the agreement, among other things, by recognizing  
“...the special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility 
in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a 
sound and viable technological base.”2 
Hence, theoretically speaking, it is possible to conclude that Art 8 (1) of the TRIPs agreement, coupled 
with Art 7, confers broad and unfiltered discretion to member countries to peruse public objectives so long as the 
measures they may adopt do not contravene other provisions of the agreement. Interestingly, the provision 
specifically mentions that the public interest measures may aim at technological development of the concerned 
country. This indicates the importance the TRIPs Agreement attached to technological development objectives 
of member countries.  
The provisions of Art. 8 allow member states to peruse this objective against abusive acts of individual right 
holders. More specifically, Sub Art. 2 of the provision authorize member states to take necessary measures 
against IPRs abuses that may hinder, among other thing, the international transfer of technology. It stipulates: 
 “Appropriate measures, provided that they are consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement, may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders 
or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology.”3 
The above quoted provision fundamentally has similar structure with that of sub. Art. 1 of Art. 8. Like 
the latter provision, it stipulates TRIPs consistency requirement. That is, the measures that may be taken to 
combat the abuse of intellectual property rights to the detriment of the international transfer of technology should 
not violet the TRIPs Agreement under both sub Articles.  Because of this and other reasons, some writers assert 
that Art. (2) of the TRIPs Agreement is somewhat a redundant provision. In this regard, it is worth quoting the 
statements of Peter K. Yu’s statement at length.  
“Virtually all the public policy objectives mentioned in the provision have already been 
addressed elsewhere in the Agreement. For example, Article 30 allows member states to 
‘provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent’ on the condition that 
such exceptions satisfy the three-step test—that is, they ‘do not unreasonably conflict with a 
normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties’. Article 31(k) 
enumerates special conditions for members to issue compulsory licenses in an effort ‘to 
remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive’. 
That provision also allows ‘[t]he need to correct anti-competitive practices . . . [to] be taken 
into account in determining the amount of remuneration in such cases’. In addition, Article 40 
permits member states to take appropriate measures to curb ‘an abuse of intellectual property 
rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market’.”4 
Though the above assertion is correct and Art 8 (2) seems superfluous, undeniably, the provision has its 
own importance. Historically, it serves as a conspicuous reminder of what LDCs initially considered the mandate 
of the GATT negotiation.  As indicated above, Art. 8 is taken from the draft text proposed by developing 
countries. As such, it symbolizes what these countries considered to be trade related intellectual property matter. 
                                                          
1 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 102, Art. 8 (1). 
2 Id, Preamble.  
3 Id, Art. 8 (2). 
4 Peter K. Yu, supra note 97, at 18. 
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During the TRIPs negotiation, developing countries1 were fiercely arguing that “it was only the restrictive and 
anti-competitive practices of the owners of the IPRs that could be considered to be trade-related because they 
alone distorted or impeded international trade.”2 These historical accounts may influence the interpretation of the 
TRIPs Agreement.  
In general, Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the TRIPs Agreement have multiple uses in the interpretation and 
implementation of the agreement.  First, they can facilitate a more flexible interpretation and implementation of 
the agreement. They provide important tool to the WTO dispute settlement bodies to take in to account the 
interests of developed and developing countries in the course of settling disputes. In face of the historical 
accounts of the provisions of Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the TRIPs Agreement and their content, it wouldn’t be logical 
and reasonable to this bodies only to give effect to high standards of protection and that ignore the special needs 
of developing countries. They must also take in to consideration developing countries side of the bargain as 
enshrined under Art 7 and Art. 8 of the agreement. Otherwise, the legitimacy of the agreement will remain 
questionable.3 Flexible interpretations of the TRIPs agreement which may result from the application of Art 7 
and Art 8 may, in turn, help developing countries to formulate laws and policies which facilities, inter alia, the 
transfer of technology in to their political territories. It will also enable these countries to take legislative 
measures to create a sound and usable technological base.  
Second, Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the TRIPs Agreement may serve as shield to defend member states’ use of 
flexibilities that have been built in to the TRIPs Agreement. These provisions made references to “social and 
economic welfare” and “a balance of rights and obligations”. These references could serve to justify exceptions 
to exclusive rights when the right holder failed to participate in social and economic development or, in other 
words, use his/her rights without discharging his/her obligations.4 In this regard, the use of Art. and Art. 8 to: 
promote access to essential medicine in less developed countries; justify the validity of fair use privilege; and 
determine whether a member state has provided an effective sui generis system to protect plant varies is 
explained by various commentators. Nonetheless, there is no wealth of literatures which explored the use of the 
two provisions in other areas including international TOT.  At any rate, Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the TRIPs 
Agreement may be used by developing countries to justify their TOT laws by explaining how the laws bring 
about technology transfer without unduly violating the exclusive rights of IPRs owners.   
Third, Art. 7 and Art. 8 of the TRIPs Agreement may also be used as a sword to challenge the existing 
high standard IPRs protection regimes of developed countries. In this regard, a certain writer noted that Art 7 and 
8 “could be invoked to limit an obligation to protect or enforce a given intellectual property right where no 
promotion of intellectual innovation and/or transfer or dissemination of technology can be proven.” 5  The 
contextual analyses of the provisions support this suggestion. Yet, it is difficult for s complainant to provide such 
proof in reality.6 Whatever the case may be, the provisions can be used at least to demand the strict application 
of provisions of the TRIPs Agreement which are meant to promote the interest of developing countries.  It is to 
assert that, in the words of Peter K. Yu, 
“[a]lthough the provisions may not provide the legal basis for challenging intellectual 
property laws and policies in developed countries in the WTO dispute settlement process, both 
provisions can be used to strengthen other operative provisions that promote social and 
economic welfare or that help preserve the balance of the intellectual property system.”7 
Art. 66 and Art. 67 are among the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement which are designed to promote 
social and economic welfare. These provisions require developed countries to provide technical assistance to 
developing countries in their endeavor to access advanced technologies and build a sound technological base. 
These provisions, with fortifications from Articles 7 and 8, are likely to become even more robust and effective. 
Understood in this sense, Art. 7 and 8 of the TRIPs Agreement can be used to build a national legal regime that 
facilitates the international transfer of technology from developed countries in to developing ones. 
 
                                                          
1 Id, at 19. (“Notably, India ‘did not regard the other aspects of IPRs [discussed in the Group at that time] to be trade-related’, 
that is, not within the mandate set up by the Punta del Este Declaration.”) 
2 Id, at 18- 19.  
3 Some authorities question the legitimacy of the TRIPs Agreement due to its high standard of protection and enforcement 
that often ignores the interest of less developed member states.  
4 Peter K. Yu, supra note 97, at 26. (“Although exceptions and limitations in the ... patent systems are generally examined 
through the three-step test laid out in Articles 13 and 30 of the TRIPS Agreement, it is important to keep in mind the 
Appellate Body’s reminder in Canada—Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products. As it stated, the Vienna Convention 
requires those interpreting and implementing the TRIPS Agreement to bear in mind the goals and limitations stated in 
Articles 7 and 8(1) when they examined the limiting conditions outlined in the three-step test.”  
5Id, at 27. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Id, at 28. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.55, 2016 
 
163 
II. Authorization to Prohibit Restrictive Patent License Agreements  
There are a number of restrictive practices in licensing agreements. These restrictive practices may defeat the 
very objectives of the TRIPs Agreement unless state parties to the agreement prohibit the practices under their 
domestic laws. Taking this fact in to consideration, member states of the agreement agreed that some licensing 
agreements’ terms and conditions may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology by restricting 
competition.1 Accordingly, the agreement authorized member states to take appropriate measure to prevent or 
control restrictive licensing conditions. In particular, Art. 40 of the agreement stipulates: 
“Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation 
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of 
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.  As 
provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this Agreement, 
appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which may include for example 
exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and coercive 
package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member.” 
The cumulative reading of sub Art.1 & 2 of the TRIPs Agreement provides that state parties can 
prohibit anti- competitive practices that may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology even if the 
prohibition goes against other provisions of the agreement. The anti- competitive practices may in particular 
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights. The TRIPs Agreement, however, left the notion of IPRs 
abuse undefined, leaving its definition to each member state. Nonetheless, it enumerated three cases of IPRs 
abuse by way of example. These are: 1) Exclusive grant back conditions;2 2) conditions preventing challenges to 
validity;3 and 3) coercive package licensing.  
At this juncture, it must be noted that IPRs abuse is not limited to anti- competitive practices. The 
TRIPs Agreement doesn’t also oblige member states to limit the scope of IPRs abuse to the same. As a result, 
member countries may consider abusive any use of an IPR that defeats its core purpose of promoting innovation 
and technology dissemination, even where the IPR holder in question is not in a position of market dominance. 
By enabling members to do so, Art. 40 of the TRIPs Agreement gives state parties the opportunity to craft TOT 
friendly domestic IP laws.    
III. Art. 66 (2) of the TRIPs Agreement  
As noted above, during the TRIPs negotiation, it was certainly recognized that the proposed agreement would 
have an adverse impact on the interest of developing countries. These countries accepted the terms and 
conditions of the TRIPs Agreement partly because industrialized countries made concessions for their interest. 
One of these arrangements is the stipulated under Art 66 (2).  As stipulated under this provision, developed 
countries agreed to provide incentives for their companies and institutions to transfer technology to least 
developed WTO member countries. Herein under, the essence and nature of these obligations will be explained 
in a fairly detail manner.  
During the TRIPs negotiation, developing countries were of the opinion that it was the vast differences 
in technological advancements among countries which is a major obstacle to commercial competition. They do 
not also lose sight of the fact that they were potentially the most to lose from the implementation of the TRIPs 
Agreement.4 It was asserted at that time that the ill effects of technological gap would be alleviated if the TRIPs 
Agreement imposed a kind of obligation on developed countries to transfer technology to WTO member LDCs. 
It is in this sense the provision of Art. 66 (2) incorporated under the TRIPs Agreement.  This provision states:  
“Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their 
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-
developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base.”5 
                                                          
1 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 102, Art. 40 (1) 
2 The draft code of conduct for the international transfer of technology defined “exclusive grantback conditions “ as  those 
contractual practices “requiring the acquiring party to transfer or grant back to the supplying party, or to any other enterprise 
designated by the supplying party, improvements arising from the acquired technology, on an exclusive basis, without 
offsetting consideration or reciprocal obligations from the supplying party, or when the practice will constitute an abuse of a 
dominant market position of the supplying party”. 
3 The same code defined  the term “conditions preventing challenges to validity”   as “conditions requiring the acquiring 
party to refrain from challenging the validity of patents and other types of protection for inventions involved in the transfer or 
the validity of other such grants claimed or obtained by the supplying party, recognizing that any issues concerning the 
mutual rights and obligations of the parties following such a challenge will be determined by the appropriate applicable law 
and the terms of the agreement to the extent consistent with that law”. 
4 Some developing countries rightly argued that since the major IP owners were OECD countries, higher IPRs protection 
would naturally result in the transfer of wealth from developing countries to developed ones through IPRs licensing schemes.  
5 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 102, Art. 66 (2). 
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From the above provision it is possible to discern some points. First, as it is the case in most TOT-
related provisions of international treaties, it distinguishes categories of addresses. It imposes a positive 
obligation on WTO member developed countries.  It doesn’t impose the obligation on private firms. This implies 
that the provision has nothing to do with market- based technology transfer, which largely occurs through private 
channel.  
The other category of addressees of the provision are WTO member LDCs. This implies that 
developing countries are not beneficiaries of the provision even if they are WTO member states. In addition, 
even LDCs which are not member to the WTO are not eligible to benefit from the provision.  Despite this 
distinction, as will be explained below, developed countries seldom make such type of distinctions when they 
undertake technology transfer activities with the view to discharge their obligation under Art. 66 (2) of the 
TRIPs Agreement.1 
Secondly, as regards the nature of the obligation, the provision doesn’t oblige developed countries to 
carry out the technology transfer themselves. It only requires these states to provide incentives to their 
enterprises and institutions to transfer technology in to WTO member LDCs. 2  Put differently, the exact 
obligation of developed countries is formulating laws and policies which encourage their firms to carry out 
technology transfer activities in WTO member LDCs.  
Thirdly, Art. 66 (2) is a “shall” provision. This word choice indicates that the provision is not a mere 
hortatory stipulation. It is to assert that the provision is not meant to make a suggestion. It is rather mandatory 
provision. It establishes a positive obligation on developed countries. The mandatory nature of the provision is 
further affirmed by the 2001 WTO Doha Decision on Implementation Issues.3 
Last, but not least, as far as the purpose of the obligation is concerned, the enterprises or institutions of 
developed countries should carry out technology transfer activities with the view to enable LDCs to create a 
sound and viable technological base. Instant establishment of a subsidiary company in LDCs with the view to 
make profit may not be considered as TOT activities for the purpose of the provision.  The incentives they may 
be provided by developed countries must also take in to account the broad purpose of the provision. 
In general, Art. 66 (2) of the TRIPs Agreement imposes a positive obligation on developed countries to 
provide incentives to their companies and institutions to transfer technology in to developing countries. This 
obligation is a mandatory one and a Council is established for the purpose of monitoring its implementation. 
Seen from its face value, it may enable one to conclude that Art. 66(2) TRIPs Agreement is friendly to the 
international flow of technology from developed to developing countries.  
IV. The Compulsory License Regime of the TRIPS Agreement and TOT   
As stated above in relation to the discussion on the Paris Convention, compulsory license is one type of 
limitation to the exercise of exclusive patent rights. A compulsory license allows the use of an invention by a 
third party up on the fulfillment of certain conditions. From the perspective of TOT, it has been further noted that 
the grant of compulsory license may result in the diffusion of technology in to the host country as, normally, the 
licensee is supposed to industrially apply the patented invention. Herein under, the situations up on the 
fulfillment of which a compulsory license may be granted under the TRIPs Agreement will be discussed. 
The TRIPs Agreement authorizes WTO member countries to provide for different forms of compulsory 
licenses in respect of patents.4 A close looks at to the previsions of Art. 31 of the TRIPs Agreement reveal that 
the grounds up on the fulfillment of which states are authorized to grant compulsory license are: the right 
holder’s refusal to deal; public interest concerns; anti-competitive practices of the rights holder; governmental 
use; need to facilitate the use of dependent patents. Below, the conditions to grant compulsory license under each 
grounds will be explained briefly.  
To begin with, in principle, the right of the patent owner to give or not give a license to a third party is 
recognized. Nonetheless, the right holder should not use this right to prevent the use of the invention 
unreasonably. Unreasonable refusal to license the use of the invention constitutes acts of abuse of patent. In these 
cases of abuse of patent, the TRIPs Agreement authorizes member states to grant compulsory license. 
Specifically, part of Art. 31 (b) of the agreement reads: 
“[Compulsory license] may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has 
made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms 
and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of 
time....”5  
                                                          
1 See infra, at 32.  
2 Suerie Moon, Does TRIPS Art. 66.2 Encourage Technology Transfer to LDCs? An Analysis of Country Submissions to the 
TRIPS Council (1999-2007) 2 (UNCTAD - ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development Policy brief No. 2,  
December 2008), available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/iprs_pb20092_en.pdf . 
3 WTO Ministerial Decision on Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns Para. 11 (WT/MIN(01)/17) (14 November 2001)  
4 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 102, Art. 31. 
5 Id, Art. 31 (b). 
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From the above quoted provision, it is possible to infer that states are authorized to grant compulsory 
license to a person who has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial 
terms and conditions and ended up vain. In accordance with this authorization, the “refusal to deal” as a ground 
for granting a compulsory license has been provided in many national laws.  
The possibility of the grant of a compulsory license in case of refusal to deal contributes to the diffusion 
of technology in to the host country in many ways. First, this regime may have the effect of stabilizing the price 
of patented technologies. If technologies are available at reasonable price, business persons may license these 
technologies to produce goods or render services. In case the right holder fix unreasonably high price, they will 
resort to the compulsory license regime to use the patented technology for same end. This implies that, one way 
or another, technologies may not remain ideal for unreasonable ground.  
Coming to public interest concerns, according to Art. 31 (b) of the TRIPs Agreement, member states 
may grant compulsory license in case of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency. 
Accordingly, the "public interest" is established in many laws as a ground for the grant of compulsory licenses. 
As opposed to cases of refusal to deal, in these latter cases, prior negotiation with the right holder to obtain 
authorization in reasonable commercial terms is not required. Yet, he/she should be served with a notice as to the 
grant of the compulsory license. In this regard, the TRIPs Agreement provides:  
“In situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, the right 
holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as reasonably practicable.  In the case of public 
non-commercial use, where the government or contractor, without making a patent search, 
knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a valid patent is or will be used by or for the 
government, the right holder shall be informed promptly.”1 
There seems no relation between the grant of compulsory license in case of public interest and TOT. 
The same holders true as regards the grant of compulsory license in cases of anti-competitive practices of the 
rights holder and governmental use. As to the grant of compulsory license to facilitate the use of dependant 
patents, The TRIPs Agreement permits the granting of compulsory licenses when the use of an invention (a 
dependent invention) is not possible without infringing another (the principal invention). Yet, the agreement sets 
out a number of conditions which have to be met if such licenses are to be granted.2 At any rate, by paving the 
way to exploit an invention using another patented invention, the permission to grant a compulsory license has 
positive impact on the inflow of technology in to the country.  
As noted above, under the Paris Convention, the non- working or insufficient working of an invention is 
one ground for the grant of compulsory license. The issue whether such a ground is available under the TRIPs 
Agreement is far from clarity. Article 27 (1) of the TRIPs Agreement stipulates that “patent rights shall be 
enjoyable without discrimination ... whether the products are imported or locally produced.” There are writers 
who understood Article 27 (1) as a provision which prohibit national laws from imposing an obligation to 
execute locally a patented invention. On the other hand, others argue that the TRIPs Agreement does not prevent 
the granting of compulsory licenses in cases of lack of or insufficient working.3 The proponents of this argument 
assert that  
“[t]he Preamble of the [TRIPs] Agreement, as well as Articles 7 and 8, make it clear that one 
of the objectives of the Agreement is to promote technology transfer, which may be ensured in 
some circumstances by means of compulsory licenses on grounds of non-working.” 4 
The controversy will likely continue among the academia until the WTO procedures finally settle it 
provided that a dispute thereon arises between WTO Members. The trend under the domestic laws of developed 
countries indicates that the obligation to locally work a patent could be satisfied by means of mere importation of 
the patented product.5  Put differently, in these countries, the local working requirement will be satisfied on the 
domestic market by import of products manufactured in other countries.  In one case, the European Court of 
Justice has endorsed this line of thinking.6  
                                                          
1 Ibid. 
2 Id, Art, 31 (l) (i-iii). 
3 Carlos M. Correa, supra note 88, at 17. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Id, at 19. (For instance, the Spanish patent law provides: “the exploitation of the patented invention by means of imports 
coming from the practicing of the invention in a member state of the World Trade Organization shall have the same effect as 
the practicing of the invention in the national territory”.) 
6 Id, at 20. (The case arises in relation to Italy’s patent law. ”... the introduction into, or the sale in the territory of, Italy of 
items manufactured in foreign countries was not considered by Italian law to constitute working of the invention. However, in 
1992 the European Court of Justice condemned Italy and established that the working requirement was satisfied on the 
domestic market by imports of products manufactured in another EC member state. The Court held that if, after 3 years from 
the date of grant of a patent, or 4 years from the filing date of the application, the proprietor of a patent or his successor in 
title has not worked the patented invention, directly or through one or more licensees, by way of production in the territory of 
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Developing countries should resist the extension of the above rule in to the WTO system. They should 
insist that non working or insufficient working a patent is one ground to grant compulsory license. For these 
countries, especially as regards TOT, import cannot be a substitute for local workings of inventions.   In fact, the 
adoption of the above rule in the WTO system will undermine the objective of the TRIPs Agreement as 
enshrined under the preamble and Art. 7 of the agreement.   
 
2.2. The International Investment Law and TOT 
Though the corpus of the international investment law is embodied in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), it is 
the TRIMs Agreement that lay the basic principles to which these treaties has to adhere to. The TRIMs 
agreement applies to investment measures which relate to trade in goods and services. The agreement provides, 
inter alia, that member states shall not apply any investment measures that are inconsistence with the principle 
of national treatment (Art. III GATT) and the prohibition of quantitative restriction (Art. XI GATT).1  The annex 
to the TRIMs Agreement contains illustrative lists that are labeled as incompatible with these obligations.2  
A close looks at to the prohibited lists of investment measures as stipulated under the annex reveal that 
the prohibition is basically constituted by local content requirements and export requirements. Other types of 
performance requirements, like export requirement, product mandating requirement and joint venture 
requirement, are not listed or indicated by way of illustration under the prohibited lists. This implies that state 
parties to the agreement may feely apply these investment measures to achieve a certain objective.  
As noted under chapter two, one of the most important mechanisms of TOT is joint venture. It has been 
explained that, due to its inherent advantages as compared to other modes of TOT, many countries have 
expressed a preference for joint ventures, with the foreign partner in a minority position, over wholly FDI.3 The 
TRIMs Agreement, by allowing state parties to stipulate joint venture requirement as a performance requirement, 
enable them to utilize this mode of TOT to the fullest extent.  The idea here is that the freedom of state parties to 
the agreement to specify joint venture requirement as a performance requirement enables member countries to 
formulate their investment law in a way that bring about technology diffusion in some  selected priority areas, as 
joint venture is an effective mode of TOT. 
In addition, the TRIMs Agreement provides that developing countries may freely deviate temporarily 
from the Principe of National Treatment to the extent and in such a manner as Article XVIII of GATT 1994.4 
This authorization may provide room for developing nations to provide special treatment to their companies until 
they build their technological capability.  
The above being the positive aspects of the TRIMs Agreement as regards TOT, it has its own pitfalls. 
The prohibition to provide for local content requirement is one of the negative aspects of the TRIMs Agreement.  
From the perspective of TOT, local content programs are useful instruments to facilitate development and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the state, or by way of importation from one of the member states of the European Community, or has worked it to an extent 
seriously disproportionate with the needs of the country, a compulsory license for the non-exclusive use of the invention may 
be granted to any person applying for it. (emphasis added)) 
1  See Annex 1A of Marrakesh Agreement, Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, (1999) I.L.M, Art. 2. 
[hereinafter TRIMs Agreement] 
2 The whole text of the annex reads:  
“1.TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 
1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative rulings, or compliance 
with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which require:  
(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from any domestic source, whether specified in 
terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its 
local production; or 
(b) that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local 
products that it exports. 
2. TRIMs that are inconsistent with the obligation of general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 
1 of Article XI of GATT 1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative 
rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and which restrict: 
(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production, generally or to an amount related to 
the volume or value of local production that it exports; 
(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production by restricting its access to foreign 
exchange to an amount related to the foreign exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise; or 
(c) the exportation or sale for export by an enterprise of products, whether specified in terms of particular products, in terms 
of volume or value of products, or in terms of a proportion of volume or value of its local production.” 
3 See also Dominique Foray, Technology Transfer in the TRIPS Age: The Need for New Types of Partnerships between the 
Least Developed and Most Advanced Economies 35 (ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper 
No.23, May 2009), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/New%202009/foray_may2009.pdf. 
4 See TRIMs Agreement, supra note 88, Art. 4. 
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diffusion of new technologies.1 In fact, local content requirements have often been used to encourage TOT — 
certainly in Japanese and Korean technological development, and more recently in Brazil, India and China.2 The 
prohibition of such type of programs necessarily narrows down the available ways to access and adopt new 
technologies. It must, however, be borne in mind that although they may be a way to transmit technological 
innovation, local content requirements necessarily imply discrimination between imported and domestic goods, 
and for this reason are inconsistent with the principle of national treatment included in the TRIMs Agreement, as 
specified in the Annex.3 
The other drawback of the international investment law as regards TOT is the exclusion of technology 
transfer requirements from the scope of the TRIMs Agreement. During the Uruguay round of negotiation, the US 
strongly argued that technology transfer requirements are particular mode of trade distorting measure. The 
TRIMs Agreement, however, would have been ideal framework for regulation of TOT embodied in FDI.4 Most 
importantly, technology transfer requirements would have helped to diffuse in the receiving country the 
knowledge necessary to reproduce products that would otherwise been imported by the host country. 5 
In general, the TRIMs Agreement is meant to promote open trade regime. As a result, it prohibits states 
from stipulating various requirements and restrictions which may distort free trade. Among other things, 
stipulating joint venture requirement is not, however,   prohibited under the TRIMs Agreement. Hence, 
developing countries may facilitate TOT by stipulating joint venture requirement as a performance requirement 
in their domestic investment law. In addition, they may also effectively utilize their entitlement to deviate from 
the national treatment principle and favor their companies which endeavor to adopt and implement foreign 
technologies.  
Moreover, the creation of an open trade regime, which is the main objective of the TRIMs Agreement, 
by itself, may facilitate TOT. Open trade normally expected to attract FDI. As explained under chapter two, FDI 
is one mode of technology transfer as the host country can profit from the positive learning externalities related 
to inward FDI. Open trade also enable firms to have easy access to capital equipment and capital equipments 
embodying foreign technologies. 
To wrap up this section, there is no comprehensive international agreement that regulate TOT. Yet, 
some treaties have their own bearing on the international transfer of technology. Among this treats, the Paris 
Convention, the TRIPs Agreement and the TRIMs Agreement are the principal ones. These agreements regulate 
the international TOT in a fragmented fashion. In fact, a specific reference to TOT is only found under the TRIPs 
Agreement. Art. 66 (2) of this agreement oblige developed nations to provide incentives to their companies and 
enterprises with the view to encourage them to transfer technology in to WTO member LDCs. The forthcoming 
section will examine the compliance mechanisms to this provision.  
 
3. Analysis of TOT Related Ethiopian Laws  
The present section is designed to address the question whether there is a suitable legal and institutional 
arrangement for the transfer of technology in Ethiopia. Accordingly, the chapter analyzes the laws of the country 
which directly or indirectly affect the inflow of foreign technology in to the country. Furthermore, the chapter 
closely examines the TOT activities of government organs which are mandated to deal with TOT processes. 
 
3.1.  Patent Law 
Ethiopia has got its patent law during the transitional period, specifically in 1995. This patent legislation is 
entitled as the “Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, Proclamation, No. 123/ 1995.” The country 
still applies this proclamation to govern the patent system. Herein under, the provisions of the proclamation 
which have direct or indirect impact on the transfer and dissemination of technology in to Ethiopia will be 
analyzed with the view to ascertain whether the proclamation crated a favorable condition for same.  
I. Patent Eligibility Criteria  
Art. 3 of the Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, Proclamation, No. 123/ 1995 lays down the 
patent eligibility criteria. As per this provision, an invention is patentable if it is new, involves inventive step and 
industrially applicable. An application for the grant of a patent right will not be grated unless the application 
meets all these three requirements. Below, the impacts of these patentability requirements on technology transfer 
will be explained.  
The first requirement for the grant of a patent is novelty (i.e, the invention must be new). The 
proclamation adopted a universal approach to define novelty. As per Art. 3 (2) of the proclamation, the novelty 
                                                          
1 John H. Barton, supra note 35, at 40. 
2 Ibid  
3 Maria Anna Corvaglia, supra note 48, at 32. 
4 Id, at 31. 
5 Ibid. 
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requirement will not be satisfied if there is no prior art publicly available in any form in any part of the world. 
This is a strict novelty standard in the sense that any written or oral prior art publicly available in any country 
destroys the novelty of an invention claimed in Ethiopia. This standard of novelty is stricter even than the 
standards of the international patent system. According to section 3(9) of the Harare Protocol, only such prior art 
that has been disclosed in written form or by use or exhibition shall be considered as destroying novelty.1 As 
opposed to Art. 3 (2) of the proclamation, there is no reference to oral disclosure. 
As regards TOT, this strict novelty requirement has its own utility. By restricting the possibilities to 
claim existing inventions as new, the absolute novelty requirement contributes to the safeguarding of a public 
domain needed for domestic firms’ and researchers’ freedom to operate. That is, Ethiopian firms and researchers 
can freely use a technology which is disclosed by any means in any part of the world for the production of goods 
and the rendition of services. No one can come thereafter and stop them from using the technology. Understood 
in this sense, the strict novelty requirement adopted by the proclamation can potentially accelerate the inflow and 
dissemination of technology in to the country. 
The second patentability requirement is non-obviousness. For the purpose of the proclamation, an 
invention is deemed to be non- obvious if it is not obvious to a person who has ordinary skill in the art 
concerned.2 The proclamation makes it clear that the assessment of non-obviousness of an invention is not only 
based on local persons skilled in the art concerned. It must also be assessed having regard to skills existing 
anywhere in the world, including technologically advanced countries. This is also a strict standard. This strict 
standard has the effect of preserving technological developments that are predicable from existing arts in the 
public domain.  
The third requirement is industrial applicability of the invention. The proclamation stipulates that an 
invention is said to be industrially applicable “where it can be made or used in handicraft, agriculture, fishery, 
social services and any other sectors.”3 This implies that research tools for which no particular use has been 
specified will not be patentable.  
From the perspective of TOT, the industrial applicability requirement may play a significant role in 
facilitating the transfer and the dissemination of technology in to the country. It may crate the platform for local 
firms to distingue between industrially applicable technologies from innovations which may not be industrially 
applicable. The idea here is that, local firms may access the list of invention which may be industrially 
applicable by simply consulting the documents of the IP office. It will also widen researchers’ freedom to 
operate and combine existing prior arts for the manufacture of goods or/and the rendition of services.  
II. Disclosure of Patented Inventions  
Patent is basically a bargain between an inventor and the society at large. In this bargain, the society enter in to a 
concession to grant exclusive right for an inventor to use or otherwise exploit the invention for a specified period 
of time. The inventor, in lieu of the grant of this exclusive right, makes publicly available the information 
necessary to use the invention. This bargain side of the inventor manifests itself through the disclosure of the use 
of the patented invention in the application for the grant of patent. As discussed below, this disclosure plays a 
significant role in the transfer and dissemination of technology in to a country in one way or another. As a result, 
the domestic law of all countries require an inventor to disclose at least one method of working of the invention 
before the grant of a patent right.  
The Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, Proclamation, No. 123/ 1995 requires a 
person who is looking for the grant of patent right to describe the invention in his/her application for the grant of 
patent. The description must disclose the invention in a clear manner so as to enable a person having ordinary 
skill in the art concerned to carry out the invention. More specifically, Art. 9 (4) (b) of the proclamation states:   
“[T]he description shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for 
the invention to be carried out by a person having ordinary skill in the art, and shall, in 
particular, indicate at least one mode known to the applicant for carrying out the invention. 
The description may be used to interpret the claims;”4 
According to the above quoted provision, the inventor is required to disclose the invention in a clear 
manner. He/she may not disclose the invention in a sophisticated manner or in such a way that may be difficult 
to be understood by an average professional in the art concerned.  Most importantly, the inventor is required to 
disclose at least one mode for carrying out the invention.  
Such discloser may facilitate technology transfer in one way or another. First, it will enable potential 
licensees to be familiar with the information necessary to carry out the invention. In case the inventor, who may 
                                                          
1  Harear protoclaol Harare Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs Within the Framework of the African Regional 
Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO), (ast amended 2013), I.L.M. Section 3 (9) 
2 Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, Proclamation, No. 123/ 1995, NEGARIT GAZETA, 54thYear No. 25, 
Art. 3 (4) , (1995) [hereinafter the  Patent Proclamation] 
3 Id, Art. 3 (5) 
4 Id, Art 9 (4) (b).  
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be a foreigner, refuses to deal with them, they may require for the grant of compulsory license and carry out the 
invention as described by the inventor. In addition, after the expiry of the period of protection, they may use the 
disclosure freely to carry out the invention.  
At this juncture, it must be noted that the disclose requirement as stipulated under the proclamation is 
not as strict as the international standard. According to Art. 29 (1) of the TRIPs Agreement,  member states may 
“...require the applicant to indicate the best mode for carrying out the invention known to the inventor at the 
filing date or, where priority is claimed, at the priority date of the application.” (emphasis added) On the contrary, 
under the Ethiopian patent law, the inventor is required to disclose at least one (not the best) mode of carrying 
out the invention. Hence, it would not be wrong for one to conclude that, by requiring the inventor to disclose at 
least one mode of carrying out the invention, the Ethiopian patent law doesn’t use the full advantage of the 
flexibility provided under Art. 29 (1) of the TRIPs Agreement.  
Requiring inventors to disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention is crucial to help local 
inventors and researchers to fully comprehend the technology claimed in the patent. In fact, as stated above, the 
traditional justification for granting exclusive rights rests upon the assumption that in exchange for the grant, 
society should benefit from the new technology incorporated in the invention. 1  Many areas of today’s 
technologies are so complex that patent applications alone are often not comprehensible to potential competitors 
of the patentee. A “best mode” requirement would thus be an important step towards the creation of a pro-
competitive environment for technology development and follow-on innovation.2 It is only when local firms and 
researchers are able to understand the technology claimed in a patent that development of patent information 
may service to support innovation and technology transfer. 
III. Experimental Use  Exception  
Patent right is not an absolute right. It is subject to various limitations. One of these limitations is the right of 
other persons to freely use the patented invention for experiment purpose. As it is the case under the patent law 
of other countries, the Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, Proclamation, No. 123/ 1995 
provides for the experimental use exception as a limitation the exclusive right of the patent holder. The 
proclamation stipulates that the right of the patentee shall not extend to excluding others from using “... the 
patented invention solely for the purposes of scientific research & experimentation”3  This exception is put in 
place not to hinder scientific and technological progress.  
The idea here is that researchers involved in basic research must experiment on the use of a patented 
invention to gain new knowledge on the subject matter of the patent itself. They must also use the invention as a 
research tool in order to develop new products and, thus, contribute to the scientific and technological progress. 
Hence, the rationale behind the experimental use exception is that, while the availability of exclusive rights 
provides an important incentive for inventors to engage in inventive activity, the privatization of certain 
substances and processes must not at the same time hinders scientific and technological progress. Understood in 
this sense, the experiment use exception carves out a “safe harbor” for research activities that might otherwise be 
blocked by patents.4 Obviously, experimental activities inevitably contribute to the technological development of 
a country and promote TOT.  
As to the scope of the experimental use exception, the issue whether the exception includes commercial 
research as experimental use is controversial in other jurisdictions. To clarify the issue a little bit, a question 
arise concerning the extent to which researchers in commercial enterprises are authorized to conduct applied 
research on or with patented inventions for the purpose of developing commercial products based on the 
protected subject matter, such as improvements or adaptations of existing products or processes, or for 
discovering ways to “invent around” the patented invention (commercial research).5 At the international arena, 
the TRIPs Agreement is silent on this issue. The WTO panel has not also any authoritative interpretation of 
article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement with respect to the question of whether and to what extent it allows 
commercial research.6 
At national level, there are domestic laws which adopt broader scope of the experimental use exception 
so as to include commercial research.  In this regard, the Ugandan Industrial Property Bill can be mentioned by 
way of example. As per Section 44(a) of the Ugandan Industrial Property Bill, using   a patented invention 
without the authorization of the patent holder “...to carry out any acts related to experimental use on the patented 
invention, whether for scientific or commercial purposes is exempted from patent infringement claims. ”  
                                                          
1 United Nations, supra note 72, at 26. 
2 Id, at 29. 
3 Patent Proclamation, supra note 147, Art. 25 (1) (b). 
4 United Nations, Development Dimensions of Intellectual Property in Uganda: Transfer of Technology, Access to Medicines 
and Textbooks 24 (UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development report, 2010), 
available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaepcb200913overview_en.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid.  
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On the contrary, a close looks at to Art 25 of the Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, 
Proclamation, No. 123/ 1995 reveal that the Ethiopian patent law adopted a narrower scope of the experimental 
use exception. This can specifically be inferred from the phrase “... solely for the purposes of scientific 
research...” under sub Art. 1 (b) of Art. 25. Furthermore, Art. 25 (a) provides that limitations to the right of the 
patentee shall only be limited to “... acts done for non-commercial purposes.” Hence, it is possible to conclude 
that, under the Ethiopian patent law, the scope of the experimental use exception is not wide enough to include 
commercial research.  
Yet, the proclamation should have included commercial researches within the scope of the experimental 
use exception so long as the objective of the research is generating new knowledge on the protected substance, as 
opposed to the mere promotion of the competitor’s commercial activity. In this regard, a certain writer notes:  
“New knowledge in this sense should be knowledge that was not contained in the original 
patent claims or their equivalents, and may take the form of either new uses of the patented 
existing substance, or of new knowledge enabling the manufacture of a new product with 
potentially superior qualities.”1  
Same understanding is adopted in the United Kingdom legal system. In one case, the United Kingdom’s high 
court upheld that:   
“...the view that a commercial purpose behind a competitor’s use of patented substances does 
not automatically rule out the possibility of invoking the experimental use exception. Most 
pharmaceutical research is driven by commercial considerations. However, the purpose of the 
experimental use defence/exception is not to promote competitors’ commercial activities, but 
to enable the generation of new knowledge on the protected substance. Thus, the defendant in 
a patent infringement suit needs to show that the immediate purpose of his activities was not to 
generate revenue, but to gain new knowledge on the patented product (e.g. to enable future 
modifications of a drug). Where the defendant’s activities have mixed purposes, the generation 
of new knowledge needs to be the preponderant purpose, while the generation of revenue may 
constitute a secondary purpose.”2 
Such type of interpretation is very important for the promotion of technological progress. Accordingly, 
it is imperative to adopt broader scope of the experimental use exception under the Ethiopian patent system.3 
Otherwise, the present narrow scope of the experimental use exception may cause a serious bottle neck in the 
transfer of know-how needed for the marketing of new technologies to the industry. Such blocking effects could 
be mitigated by invoking an experimental use exemption that enables the industry to use the results of basic 
research to develop new or follow-on technologies.4 
In short, the experimental use exception plays a significant role in facilitating TOT by enabling 
researchers to freely use patented inventions for research purposes. The role of this exception can be heighted by 
adopting a broader scope of the experimental use exception that includes commercial researches. If its scope is 
broadened accordingly, the exception can play a pivotal role in promoting scientific and technological progress.  
IV. Patent of Introduction  
Under the Ethiopian patent law, patent of introduction is a right which is given to a person who introduced a 
technology in the political territory of Ethiopia. This right is given to the technology introducer up on the 
fulfillment of the following requirements.    
1. The invention must be patented abroad; 
2. The patent shall not be expired;  
3. The invention should not be a patented one in Ethiopia; and  
4. The invention must be new5, involve inventive step and industrially applicable.6 
Up on the fulfillment of these conditions, patent of introduction may be granted to the applicant. The 
introducer is entitled to exercise same right as a patentee for a period of 10 years. But, the introducer is required 
                                                          
1 Id, at 26-27. 
2 Id, at 27. 
3 Nonetheless, it is equally important to take outmost care not compromise the normal exploitation of the invention in the 
course of adopting a broader scope of the experimental use exception. 
4 United Nations, supra note 153, at 27. 
5 Ermias Biadgleng, Domestic Legislation and Court Decisions on Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health in Ethiopia 
2 (UNCTAD Country Analysis, December 2011), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/36584/1/MPRA_paper_36584.pdf . (Some authorities question the “ ... how a patent of introduction can be 
validly granted when it still has to meet the novelty standard. If a patent has been disclosed and granted abroad, the disclosure 
will already destroy the novelty of the claim when application is made in Ethiopia. In the opinion of the writer of this paper, 
the standard of novelty under the patent of instruction regime is not same as the patent law. It adopted a national novelty 
standard.) 
6 See The Patent Proclamation, supra note 96, Arts.18 & 19 
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to prove the working of the invention each year as from the third year after the right is granted.1 
It must be noted that the patent of introduction regime of Ethiopia is not compatible to the TRIPs 
Agreement. At any rate, by adopting this regime of patent of introduction, the proclamation attempts to 
encourage persons to introduce foreign technology in to Ethiopia. Hence, as regards TOT, the patent of 
introduction regime can potentially play a significant role for the adaption and implementation of foreign 
technology in Ethiopia. So far, the EIPO granted 148 patent of introduction protection.2 These technologies 
would not have enter in to the country had had the country didn’t adopt the patent of introduction regime.  
V. Compulsory License 
Under the Ethiopian patent law, a compulsory license may be granted to a third person contrary to the will of a 
patentee in three situations. These are when: 1) An invention cannot be worked effectively without an earlier 
invention; 2) an earlier invention cannot be worked effectively without a latter invention; and 3) The patentee 
fails to work the invention after the expiration of three years from the date of the grant of patent or four years 
from the date of filing the application.3 
This legal arrangement, as explained in relation to the compulsory license regimes of the Paris 
Convention and the TRIPs Agreement, may foster the technology transfer in to the country. The working of the 
invention normally requires the acquisition of   know –how and other necessary information.  It may also require 
the participation of many professional personnel. The exposure of these personnel to new technologies inevitably 
results in the spillover of technology in to the country. Nonetheless, so far, the EIPO didn’t grant even a single 
compulsory license to a third party as local firms haven’t the technological capability to use patented 
technologies.   
VI. Utility Model Certificate  
Utility model certificate generally provides protection to inventions that do not fulfill the “inventive step (non-
obviousness)” test under the patent law, but that contribute a new and useful product to the society. In most legal 
systems, the other requirements for the grant of patent, i.e, novelty and industrial applicability, must be satisfied 
for the grant of utility model certificate. The same holds true under the Ethiopian legal system.  
As per Art. 38 (1) of the Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, Proclamation, No. 123/ 
1995, “[a] minor invention that possesses novelty & industrial applicability shall give rise to a right to protection 
in favor of the author there of.” Nonetheless, the novelty test is not as strict as that of patent law. For the purpose 
of the utility model certificate regime, a minor invention is considered to be new if, at the time of filling of the 
application, it has not been described in printed publication, made available to the public or publicly used in 
Ethiopia.4 As opposed to the case of patent, oral disclosure of the minor invention or its working abroad does not 
destroy the novelty of the minor invention.  
The right to a utility model certificate protection is evidenced by a utility model certificate issued by the 
EIPO.5 The certificate confers exclusive right to exploit the minor invention to the certificate holder and prevent 
third parties from exploitation the minor invention without the authorization of the same.6 The duration of the 
certificate is five years. However, it may be renewed for a further five years period provided that proof is 
furnished to the effect that the minor invention is being worked in Ethiopia.7 As to the content of the right, the 
provisions of the proclamation that provide for the rights of a patentee are applicable, mutatis mutandis, to utility 
model certificate holders. 8  
These terms of protection can be justified against the need to provide some incentives to local inventors 
to engage in potentially costly and time consuming R & D activity. More specifically, as regards TOT, utility 
model protection encourages local firms to adapt foreign technologies for local circumstances. This makes the 
utility model certificate regime compatible with the objectives of the patent legislation as enshrined under the 
proclamation. So far, the office grated 659 utility model certificates. 
VII. The Duty to Locally Work the Invention 
As explained in relation to the compulsory regimes of the TRIPs Agreement and the Paris Convention, the local 
working of an invention is crucial for the inflow of foreign technology in that country.  As a result, it is further 
noted that developing countries impose the obligation to sufficiently work the invention on the patent owner at 
the pain of granting compulsory license to a third party who is capable to locally work the invention. It is also 
discussed that, in developed countries, there is a trend to substitute the duty of local working of the invention 
                                                          
1 Id, Art. 21 
2 Interview with Ato Tewdrhos Nigussie, Senior Patent Expert of the Ethiopian Intellectual Office, in Addis Ababa (February 
2, 2015). 
3 The Patent Proclamation, supra note 147, Art. 29 
4 Id, Art. 39 (1) 
5 Id, Art. 38 (2) 
6 Id, Art. 38 (2) 
7 Id, Art. 44 
8 See Id, Art. 45 
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with the duty to import products of the invention. Yet, as regards TOT, it is asserted that import cannot be a 
substitute to local working of the invention. In fact, the principal way in which patens may contribute directly to 
the transfer of technology to the host country is through the exploitation of the patented technology in the host 
country by the foreign patent owner himself/herself or with his/her consent by third parties.1 Accordingly, in 
developing countries, local working of the invention continues to be one of the main obligations of the patentee. 
And, Ethiopia is not an exception in this regard.  
Art. 27 of the Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, Proclamation, No. 123/ 1995 oblige 
patentees of an invention to work the patented invention or to authorize a third party to work the invention in 
Ethiopia. The provision states that “[t]he patentee shall have the duties to work the patented invention or to 
authorize other persons to do the same in Ethiopia.” Furthermore, the proclamation requires the patentee to work 
the invention in a scale which is adequate and reasonable in the circumstance. Failure to do so is one of the 
grounds for the grant of a compulsory license to a third party.2 
The above discussion makes it clear that, under the Ethiopian legal system, a patentee has the obligation 
to sufficiently work the invention locally or authorize a third party to do so at the pain of granting a compulsory 
license to a third party. Obviously, the working of an invention locally results in the spillover of technology in to 
the country. Hence, the duty to work or authorizing a third party to do the same plays a pivotal role in facilitating 
the transfer of technology in to the country. Nonetheless, the EIPO didn’t develop a mechanism to follow up the 
sufficient working of patented technologies in Ethiopia.3 In fact, it depends on the self reporting of patent holders 
to extend the period of protection for a patent4  
VIII. Absence of Prohibited Terms in Patent Licensing Agreements  
One of the modes by which a patentee may exploit his/her invention is by licensing others to work the invention. 
This mode of exploiting the patented invention is indicated under Art. 22 (1) of the Inventions, Minor Inventions 
and Industrial Designs Proclamation. This provision states that “[a] patentee shall have the exclusive right to 
make, use or otherwise exploit the patented invention. A third party cannot exploit the patented invention 
without securing the patentee's consent.” The phrase “...otherwise exploit...” in the first lib of the provision 
suggests that a patent author may exploit the invention, among other things, by assigning or licensing it. The last 
lib of the provision also confirms this assertion. Its acontrario reading provides that a third party may exploit the 
patented invention only if the patentee authorizes him/her/it to do so. The patentee may give his/her permission 
to a third party to exploit the invention by a licensing agreement.  
In other jurisdictions, licensing agreement is needed to be registered before the respective countries’ IP 
office. The patent law of these countries authorizes the register to refuse to register the license contract if the 
register is of the opinion that any clause in the license contract imposes unjustified restrictions on the licensee. 
This implies that there are prohibited terms in a license agreement. The main objective of prohibiting some terms 
of license agreements is to promote technology spillover from a patent holder (in case of developing countries, 
mostly a foreign) to local licensees.  
At the international arena, the TRIPs Agreement is not against provisions which prohibit restrictive 
terms of licensing agreements. As explained above, according to article 7 of the TRIPs Agreement, one of the 
main objectives of the agreement is the promotion of technology transfer and dissemination. Art. 8 (1) of the 
agreement authorizes members to formulate their laws in a way that is conducive of promoting “the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development”. Article 8 (2) of 
the TRIPS Agreement authorizes members to adopt appropriate measures to, inter alia, prevent practices by 
intellectual property holders that adversely affect the international transfer of technology. Hence, it would be 
illogical had the TRIPs Agreement was against provisions which prohibit restrictive licensing practices. In fact, 
the agreement explicitly authorizes member states to prohibit in their domestic laws such terms under Art. 40.  
When we turn our face to the Ethiopian patent law, it seems that the proclamation fails to regulate 
restrictive patent licensing practices. There is no specific provision in the proclamation which prohibits 
respective licensing terms and conditions. In fact, let alone prohibiting restrictive terms and conditions, the 
proclamation fails to provide for the formality requirements of license agreements. This legal lacuna may 
provide an opportunity to foreign patent owners to take advantage of the technological needs of local firms to 
enter in to a license agreement which is highly restrictive. These terms may limit technological learning and 
mastery by local firms.  As such, the country IP system may give effect to patent licensing agreements which 
contain terms and conditions which are inconsistence with the objectives of the patent law of the country, more 
specifically, the objective to encourage the transfer and adaption of foreign technology.  
Furthermore, the proclamation fails to address a number of other important anti-competition practices 
                                                          
1 Getachew Menigiste, supra note 93, at 170. 
2 The Patent Proclamation, supra note 147, Art. 29 (1). 
3 Interview with Ato Twedrhos Nigussie, supra note 163  
4 Ibid. 
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and IPRs abuses.   As stated above, the TRIPs Agreement enumerates exclusive grant back conditions and 
conditions preventing challenges to validity as anti-competitiveness.1  The agreement authorizes member states 
to prohibit such type of practices as they are against the objective of the TRIPs Agreement to transfer and 
disseminate technology. By failing to prohibit such type of terms and conditions, the Ethiopia patent law opens 
the door for foreign parent owners to enter in to licensing agreements which may defeat the purpose of the 
proclamation. 
To wrap up the present sub section, the Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs 
Proclamation promises to create conducive legal environment for the inflow of foreign technology into the 
country.  The analysis of the substantive parts of the proclamation reveals that while there are provisions which 
may encourage TOT in one way or another, some other provisions and legal lacunas may work against the 
objective of the proclamation to foster technology diffusion in to the country. The patentability requirements, the 
patent of introduction regime, the compulsory license regime, the protection accorded to minor inventions and 
the duty to work the invention locally are some of the most important legal arrangements devised by the 
proclamation with respect to the promotion of TOT. On the other hand, the proclamation doesn’t seem adopt the 
rules on disclosure and experimental use exceptions in such a way that may bring about maximum utility. 
With respect to the rule on disclosure, the proclamation requires the applicant to disclose at least one 
mode of carrying out the invention. It would have been better had had the proclamation required the applicant to 
disclose the best mode of carrying out the invention, as it is the case under the TRIPs Agreement. As to the 
experiential use exception, the proclamation limited the scope of this exception to cases of basic researches. It 
excluded commercial researches from the ambit of the exception.  The exception could have result in more 
spillover of technology in to the country had the proclamation extended the scope of the exception to include 
cases of commercial researches which primarily aimed at the creation of new knowledge.   
Coming to the legal lacuna that may work against the objective of the proclamation, it fails to address 
IPRs abuse issues. In particular, the proclamation fails to prohibit restrictive patent licensing practices. It also 
fails to provide for cases IPRs abuse. This legal lacuna may provide an opportunity to patentees to license their 
invention to local firms in a way that hinder the diffusion of the technology in the country. 
 
3.2.  Investment Law 
Since the transitional period, as indicated above, Ethiopia has seen four investment proclamations, one 
repealing/amending the other. Now days, the active investment law consists of the investment proclamation No. 
769/2012 and the regulations and directives enacted there from. The investment proclamation provides for, inter 
alia, the country’s investment objectives, areas of investment reserved for the government, areas of investment 
reserved for Joint Investment with the Government, Areas of Investment Reserved for Domestic Investors, Areas 
of Investment Allowed for Foreign Investors and the powers and responsibilities of the Investment Agency (now 
Commission). Under this sub section, the provisions of the proclamation which directly or indirectly relate with 
TOT in to Ethiopia will be analyzed.  
To begin with, as stated under the preamble of the investment proclamation, one of the driving forces 
behind the enactment of the proclamation is the need to speed up the transfer of foreign technology in to the 
country.2 In addition, advancing the inflow of foreign technology in to the country is stated as one objective of 
the country’s investment law. Part of Art. 5 of the proclamation stipulates:  
“The investment objectives of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia are designed to 
improve the living standards of the peoples of Ethiopia through the realization of sustainable 
economic and social development, the particulars of which [include]...advanc[ing] the 
transfer of technology required for the development of the country.”3 
The preamble statement and the above quote provision indicate the paramount place given to TOT 
under the country’s investment law. What matters most, however, is the suitability of the substantive laws for 
facilitating the inflow of foreign technology in to the country. The discussion follow scrutinizes the legal 
arrangements put in place by the country’s investment law with the view to address the issue whether the 
investment law crated a favorable legal condition for the inflow of technology in to the country.  
As stated above, the proclamation specified investment areas totally reserved for the government and 
investment areas to be undertaken jointly with the government. The investment areas exclusively reserved for the 
government are listed under Art. 6 (1).4 Sub Art. 2 of the same provision lists the investment areas in which 
                                                          
1 The Patent Proclamation, supra note 147, Art. 4 (2). 
2Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 18th Year No. 63, preamble, (2012).  
3 Id, Art. 5 (8). 
4 Id, Art. 6 (1). (These are:  
“a) transmission and distribution of electrical energy through the integrated national grid system;  
b) postal services with the exception of courier services;  
c) air transport services using aircraft with a seating capacity of more than fifty passengers.”) 
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private investors may invest only jointly with the government. The whole text of Art. 6 (2) reads: 
“2/ Investors shall be allowed to invest in the following areas only jointly with the government:  
a) Manufacturing of weapons and ammunition;  
b) Telecom services.”1 
The rationale for allowing joint investment of private investors and the government in the above listed 
areas of investment may be the need to access foreign technology. The manufacturing of weapons and 
ammunition inevitably triggers security issues. These are areas of investment where the production the 
production process employs sophisticated technologies. In addition, the production process of these materials is 
held in secret. It is with the view to acquiring these technologies that the investment law allowed private 
investors to engage in the manufacture of these products jointly with the government.  
With respect to the Telecom sector, in addition to security issues, the government doesn’t opt the 
involvement of the private sector in this area of investment for economic reasons. By the same token, it is only 
with the view to access foreign technologies the government allow the involvement of private investors in the 
telecom service jointly with the government. Yet, to date, there are no private investors who invest jointly with 
the government in the abovementioned investment areas.  
Coming to investment areas exclusively reserved for domestic investors, Art. 7 authorizes the Council 
of Ministers to determine same by regulation. As per this authorization, the Council of Ministers enacted the 
Investment Incentives and Investment Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors Council of Ministers Regulation 
No. 270/2012. Art. 3 of this regulation lists investment areas exclusively reserved for domestic investors. These 
are:  
a) “Banking, insurance and micro- credit and saving services; 
b) Packing, forwarding and shipping agency services; 
c) Broadcasting service; 
d) Mass media services; 
e) Attorney and legal consultancy services; 
f) Preparation of indigenous traditional medicines; 
g) Advertisement, promotion and translation works; [and]  
h) Air transport services using aircraft with a seating capacity up to 50 passengers.”2 
It seems that the government exclusively reserved the above listed investment areas to domestic 
investors because of economic and cultural reasons. Yet, since some of these investment areas, like the financial 
sector, needs to employ new technologies to be competitive in the international market, it would have been better 
had foreign investors were allowed to invest in these areas jointly with domestic investors. 
As to investment areas in which foreign investors are allowed to invest, Art 8 of the regulation indicates 
that foreign investors are encouraged to participate in the manufacturing sector. Since one mode of TOT is FDI, 
the involvement of foreign investors in the manufacturing industry will result in technology diffusion in to the 
country. In this regard, the question that needs to be addressed is whether the investment law crates favorable 
ground to attract FDI.  
The proclamation guarantees foreign investors against expropriation.3  It also entitles them to, in respect 
of their approved investment, to make the remittances out of Ethiopia.4 Furthermore, it requires the investment 
agency to provide one-stop shop services. 5  All these arrangements are meant to create conducive legal 
environment for FDI. Hence, by attracting FDI, the proclamation is trying to create conducive environment for 
the transfer of technology in to the country.  
As explained under chapter two, the other method of acquiring foreign technology is joint venture. To 
achieve its objective of advancing the inflow of foreign technology in to the country, the investment law is 
expected to encourage joint venture investments between foreign investors and domestic investors by, for 
instance, providing attractive incentives to such type of investments.  
The investment proclamation tries to provide some incentives for foreign investors who jointly invest 
with domestic investors by lowering the minimum capital required to allocate for a single investment. According 
to Art. 11 (1), a foreign investor is required to allocate a minimum capital of USD 200,000 for a single 
investment project. However, if the foreign investor invests jointly with a domestic investor, the minimum 
capital he/she is required to allocate for a single investment will be lowered to USD 150,000.6 If the investor is 
investing in architectural or engineering works or related technical consultancy services, technical testing and 
                                                          
1 id, Art. 6 (2). 
2 Id, Art 3 (1). 
3 Id, Art. 25. 
4 Id, Art. 26. 
5 Id, Art. 30. 
6 Id, Art. 11 (2) 
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analysis or in publishing work, the minimum capital required of will be reduced by USD 100,000.1 In both cases, 
the proclamation reduces the minimum initial capital a foreign investor should allocate for a single investment 
by USD 50,000 if the investor invests jointly with a domestic investor. This can be taken as an incentive for a 
foreign investor to invest jointly with domestic investors.  
This incentive is not, however, adequate enough to influence foreign investors’ decision making so as to 
jointly invest with a domestic investor in lieu of wholly owned FDI. Put in a slightly different word, the net USD 
50,000 is so nominal to influence foreign investors’ decision making. Hence, it is possible to conclude that this 
incentive hardly contribute to the country’s endeavor to access foreign technology through joint venture projects. 
This incentive may bring about tangible change if the gap between the minimum capital required for wholly 
owned FDI and joint venture projects is meaningful so as to influence the mind set up of foreign investors. 
The other way by which the investment law may encourages the inflow of technology in to the country 
is by providing different incentives to investors to encourage them to engage in investment areas where there is 
high technological gap, and set as priority areas. In this regard, the proclamation authorizes the Council of 
Ministers to specify investment incentives. In specifying these investment incentives, the proclamation demand 
the council to take the investment objectives listed under Art. 5 of the proclamation. As explained above, one of 
the investment objectives of the country is speeding up the inflow of foreign technology in to the country. Hence, 
one can reasonably expect that the Council of Ministers provides for attractive investment incentives to investors 
who may invest in areas of investment in which there is high technological gap, and areas of investment set as 
priority areas in different policy documents of the country. Herein under, the provision of the regulation will be 
analyzed with the view to ascertain the same. 
As discussed under chapter two, the investment proclamation doesn’t consider purchase of capital 
goods as technology transfer transaction. Nonetheless, it is further noted that the commercial transfer and 
acquisition of technology can take place with the sale and purchase of equipments and other capital goods.  
Hence, purchases of capital goods and their import into a country may, in a sense, foster the inflow of foreign 
technology. Put differently, the imports of capital equipments inevitably enhance a country’s technological 
capability.  
As a result, many countries encourage the inflow of capital goods by providing different incentives to 
impostors of these goods. Ethiopia is not an exception in this regard. The Investment Incentives and Investment 
Areas Reserved for Domestic Investors Council of Ministers Regulation provides for cases in which investors 
may import capital goods free from custom duty. As per Art. 13 of the regulation, any investor who engaged in 
any of the areas of investment other than real estate development, publishing, export of trade of raw agricultural 
products and petroleum trade may import duty-free capital goods and construction materials necessary for 
establishment of new enterprises. They are also entitled to same exemption where they import capital 
equipments to upgrading existing enterprise.  
These investment incentives to some extent minimize the cost of establishing enterprises which require 
high- tech materials. They may, in effect, encourage investors to invest in these areas of investment. As a result, 
the know-how embodied in the operation of high- tech equipments may be acquired by local personnel. Apart 
from the operation of these machineries, the local personnel may conduct improvement researches with the view 
to make the technology more suitable to local realities. Understood in this sense, the custom duty exemption of 
import of capital goods may speed up the inflow of foreign technology in to the country.  
The other investment incentive provided under the regulation is income tax exemption. The regulation 
stipulates that investors who invest in some selected areas of investment are entitled to income tax exemption 
from one year to 12 years, having regard to the areas of investment and the place of the investment. 
As explained above, the agriculture, leather and textile sectors are identified as priority areas in which 
the government is eager to attract investors. Different policies and strategies identified these sectors as priority 
areas in which the government aims at bringing about rapid technology transfer. Consistently with this policy 
choice, the investment regulation entitles investors who invest in these areas of investment for higher duration of 
income tax exemption. In addition, any investor who expands or upgrades his/her existing enterprise is entitled 
to same income tax exemption with respect to the additional income generated by the expansion or upgrading.2 
Moreover, if the investor exports or supplies his/her product to an exporter as production or service input, at least 
60% of his/her products or services  will be entitled to income tax exemption for additional two years.3 
These investment incentives may encourage investors to establish new manufacturing enterprises and/or 
expand or upgrade existing ones by importing high- tech machineries. This may, in turn, bring about diffusion of 
                                                          
1 Id, Art. 11 (3). (This provision states that “[t]he minimum capital required of a foreign investor investing in architectural or 
engineering works or related technical consultancy services, technical testing and analysis or in publishing work shall be:  
a) USD 100,000 if the investment is made wholly on his own;  
b) USD 50,000 if the investment is made jointly with a domestic investor.”) 
2 Id, Art. 6 (1). 
3 Id, Art. 7. 
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foreign technologies in to the country. 
At this juncture, it is important to note that the incentives are provided to both domestic and foreign 
investors alike. This can be inferred from the use of phrase “any investor...” under Art. 6 and Art. 13 of the 
regulation. This equal treatment of foreign and domestic investors may attract foreign investors to invest in 
Ethiopia. As explained under chapter two, one of the ways by which technology my inflow in to a country is FDI. 
Hence, it is possible to assert that, by attracting FDI, these incentives may facilitate the diffusion of foreign 
technology in to Ethiopia.  
The investment proclamation also aims at bringing about technology transfer in to Ethiopia by 
stipulating the need to replace expatriates by Ethiopian nationals. Technological know-how may be transferred to 
nationals of a country wherever they can operate sophisticated technologies. The proclamation entitles foreign 
investors to employ duly qualified expatriates required for the operation of their business.1  Yet, they can employ 
these expatriates only for a limited period of time. They are responsible to replace these expatriates by 
Ethiopians by arranging necessary training thereof.2 
The rationale behind this requirement is transferring the skills and know-how of the expatriates to 
Ethiopians, and, thereby, bringing TOT in to the country. As to the period of time within which the expatriates 
need to be replaced by Ethiopian nationals is not specified. The law simply states “within a limited period....” 
This rather vague term should be interpreted on a case by case basis having regard to the circumstances of each 
case.  However, practically, the Ethiopian Investment Commission requires expatriates to renew their work 
permit every three years. 3  This extension may only be granted up on the approval of senior government 
officials.4  
At this juncture, it must be noted that the Ethiopian Investment Commission is mandated to give work 
permit to expatriates who work in manufacturing sectors. If an expatriate work in other sectors, it will be the 
mandate of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to grant, renew or extend his/her work permit. 5 The 
Ministry grants and extends work permits having regard to the educational background of the expatriate.6  
It is also worth noting here that the above legal arrangement doesn’t work as regards expatriates of top 
management of enterprises. Foreign investors have the right to employ expatriate employees on top management 
position for their enterprises without any restriction.7  It doesn’t matter whether there are Ethiopian professionals 
who can effectively run the businesses of the investor. In addition, the work permit of an expatriate may freely 
be renewed if the works in a foreign company which enter in to an agreement with the government to build 
infrastructures. His/her work permit will be freely renewed until the company finished the project.8   
To wrap up this section, speeding up technology transfer in to Ethiopia is one of the rationales behind 
the enactment of the country’s investment law. This can be inferred from both the preamble and substantive parts 
of the investment proclamation No. 769/2012. To achieve this objective, the proclamation created different legal 
arrangements.  
To state some of the legal arrangements created by the investment proclamation that seem to take in to 
account this objective of the law in to consideration, it exempts the import of capital goods from custom duties. 
It also provides for income tax exemption from 1 year to 12 years from the date of production. These investment 
incentives may encourage investors to import high- tech machineries and establish new enterprises or 
expand/upgrade the existing ones. This, in effect, may facilitate the diffusion of foreign technologies in to the 
country. In addition, since the investment incentives are provided to both foreign and domestic investors alike, 
they may attract FDI. As noted repeatedly, FDI is one method of TOT. Hence, by encouraging foreign investors 
to invest in the country, the proclamation aimed at, inter alia, bringing about technology diffusion in to the 
country.  
Moreover, the proclamation also provides for legal arrangement by which an expatriate need to be 
replaced by Ethiopian national. It specifically requires firms to provide necessary training to Ethiopians with the 
view to enable them to replace expatriates within a limited period of time.  In doing so, the proclamation aimed 
at transfer of technological know-how from foreign nationals to Ethiopians. Such type of knowledge transfer, in 
one way or another, speed up the spillover of technology in to the country.  
As regards TOT through joint venture, the proclamation lowers the minimum capital a foreign investor 
                                                          
1 Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012, supra note 136, Art. 37 (1). 
2 Id, Art. 37 (2) 
3  Interview with Ato Mohamedur Yesuf, Licensing and registration Directorate Director of the Ethiopian Investment 
Commission, in Addis Abeba (January 30, Addis Abeba).    
4 Ibid.  
5 Labour Proclamation No. 377/2003, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 10thYear No. 12, Art. 174 , (2003). 
6 Interview with Ato Daniel Lemma, Expatriate Work Permit Service Team Coordinator of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Affairs, in Addis Abeba (January 15, 2015). 
7 Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012, supra note 136, Art. 37. 
8 Interview with Ato Daniel Lemma, supra note 192.  
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should allocate for a single project by USD 50,000 if the foreign investor invests jointly with domestic investors. 
This investment incentive is nominal so as to influence the decision making of a foreign investor. Since joint 
venture is most important mode of TOT, the proclamation should have provided for attractive investment 
incentives for joint venture projects between foreign and domestic investors.  
By way of final remark, the Ethiopian investment law doesn’t envisage the possibility of investment in 
technology, let alone providing packages of incentives to the same. The proclamation defines investment as 
“expenditure of capital in cash or in kind or in both by an investor to establish a new enterprise or to expand or 
upgrade one that already exists.”1 Investment in technology, i.e expenditure of capital to generate technology, 
doesn’t fall within the ambit of this definition.  
 
3.3.  Franchising  Regulation 
As stated under chapter two, one of the methods of TOT is franchising. Franchising is a long-term cooperative 
relationship between two entities—a franchisor and one or more franchisees—that is based on an agreement in 
which the franchisor provides a licensed privilege to the franchisee to do business.2 It is also noted that the 
privilege may pertain to the use of a trade name, brand name, methods of production, service and marketing, and 
an entire business operational method. Due to its importance, many countries regulate franchising business.  
In Ethiopia, there is no specific legislation which regulates franchising agreements. In fact, the term “franchise” 
is not mentioned both in the civil and commercial code. There is also no government organ explicitly authorized 
to regulate franchising businesses. Yet, this should not be taken to mean there are no relevant laws which may be 
applicable to business franchises in Ethiopia. There are, indeed, patchworks of disparate laws that incidentally 
affect the activities of franchisors in Ethiopia.3 
One of these legislations is the Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012. As stated above, under a 
franchise agreement, the franchisor and the franchisee may enter in to an agreement which entitle the latter to use 
the methods of production, service and marketing, or the entire business operation model of the former. Such 
types of agreements are considered as TOT agreements under the investment proclamation. As per Art. 2 (1) of 
the proclamation, TOT agreement refers to, inter alia, the transfer of systemic knowledge for the manufacture of 
a product, for the application or improvement of a process or for the rendering of a service, including 
management and marketing technologies.  
Accordingly, franchising agreements which transfer the methods of production, service and marketing, 
or the entire business operation model to an Ethiopian franchisee may be required to be registered before the 
Investment Commission in accordance with Art 21 (1) & (2) of the proclamation.4 However, one should not lose 
sight the fact that transfer of knowledge doesn’t always presupposes transfer of business models as it is in the 
case of franchising. The franchisor may simply transfer its trademark or other designations that represent 
his/her/it’s goodwill, but may not introduce certain patented machinery for the manufacture of the goods of the 
franchisee. In these cases, the franchise agreement will not be subject to the investment proclamation. It is only 
in cases where the franchise agreement includes, for example, the transfer of marketing technology, management 
and proprietary business process that the franchise agreement will be subject to the requirements of the 
investment proclamation.  
The other piece of legislation that may regulate franchise agreements in Ethiopia is the Trademark 
Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006. As per Art. 26 of this proclamation, it is only owners of 
a registered trademark who shall have the right to, inter alia, license the use of a trademark. Hence, in order to 
license his/her/its trade mark, a foreign franchisor is required to register the trademark before the EIPO. 
Furthermore, the franchise agreement for the use of the trademark itself needs to register before the same office. 
5 
Now, the question is whether a franchise agreement for the use of a trademark by an Ethiopian firm 
                                                          
1 Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012, supra note 178, Art. 2(1). 
2 http://www.Franchoise.com/franchising-consulting-reques?origin=home&destination=consultGlobal   
3 Ibid.  
4 Investment Proclamation No. 769/2012, supra note 178, Art. 21(1). (This provision   stipulates that  “[w]here any investor 
concludes a technology transfer agreement related to his investment, he shall submit same to the Agency for registration.” 
The sanction for failure to comply with this requirement is provided under sub Art. (4) of the same proclamation. It reads: “A 
technology transfer agreement which is not registered with the Agency in accordance with this Article shall have no legal 
effect.”) 
5 Trademark Registration and Protection Proclamation No. 501/2006, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 12thYear No. 14, Art. 
29 (2), (2006). (As per this provision,”[a] license contract on a registered trademark or  an application for registration of a 
trademark, a as well as modification or termination of the license contract shall be submitted to the Office. The Office shall 
register the contract as well as its modification and termination and, by keeping the details as confidential, cause it  
publication  an Intellectual property gazette or a newspaper having nationwide circulation. The license shall have no effect 
against third parties until so registered.”) 
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may has any bearing on the inflow of foreign technology in to the country. The proclamation stipulates that a 
license contract on a registered trade mark should contain a provision which provides for effective control by the 
licensor on the quality of the goods or services of the licensee in connection with which the mark is used. Failure 
to do so results in the nullification of the agreement. In the word of the proclamation, 
“[a]ny license contract on a registered trademark or an application for registration of a 
trademark shall be null and void when it does not contain a provision for an effective control, 
by the licensor, of the quality of the goods or the services in connection with which the 
trademark may be used.”1 
The rationale behind the above stipulation may be the need to protect consumers. The idea is that the 
use of the trademark by a licensee may mislead consumers as to the quality of the goods unless the licensor 
effectively control the quality of the goods. Whatever the case may be, in order to produce goods and render 
services which have comparable qualities with the goods and services provided abroad, the franchisee may need 
the technical assistance of the franchisor. The franchisor may, as a result, provide training to the personnel of the 
franchisee and/or supply advanced technologies to the franchisee with the view to enable the latter to produce 
goods and render services which are up to the standard.  This will inevitably result in the spillover of technology 
in to the country.  
In addition, even in the absence of the above stipulation, since international franchisors are akin to 
maintain the goodwill built in relation to their trademark, they may transfer production, management and 
marketing technologies to the franchisee by their own initiation. As a result, local firms will access foreign 
technology. Understood in this sense, trademark franchise may promote TOT.  
At this juncture, it must be noted that, as opposed to the patent law, the trademark proclamation outlaws 
restrictive clauses in trademark licensing agreements. As per Art. 31. (1) of the proclamation, clauses in a 
trademark license contract shall be null and void in so far as they impose upon the licensee unjustified 
restrictions. Yet, restrictive clauses may be given effect if the clauses are derived from the rights conferred by 
the registration of the trademark or necessary for the safeguarding of these rights.2 In addition, for the purpose of 
the trademark proclamation, limitation concerning, inter alia, the territory in connection with which the 
trademark might be used is not considered as restrictive business practice.3 
The Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Design Proclamation No. 12/1997 is the other piece of 
legislation which is relevant to the regulation of franchise business in Ethiopia. This is particularly the case 
where the franchise agreement involves the use of the franchisor’s intellectual property by the franchisee.  In 
order to license the use of his/her/its intellectual property, the franchisor normally applies for the grant of patent 
or any other related rights. In doing so, the franchisor is required to disclose at least one way of carrying out the 
technology. This disclose, as explained above in relation to the role of the patent law in TOT, result in the 
spillover of technology in to the country.  
To sum up, so far, Ethiopia doesn’t have comprehensive franchise law. This doesn’t mean, however, 
that franchise business is totally unregulated subject matter. There are rules that are scattered here and there in 
different pieces of legislations. While some types of franchise agreements are supposed to be registered before 
the Investment Commission in accordance with the investment proclamation, some others are subject to the 
trademark proclamation. The remains are governed by the IP law of the country. This implies that, in Ethiopia, 
franchise agreements are not subject to the same legislations. This will inevitably create legal uncertainty. In fact, 
the luck of interest among international franchisors to do business with Ethiopian firms may partly be attributed 
to this legal uncertainty. Given the pivotal role franchising agreements may play in technology transfer, it is 
imperative to enact comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for the operation of a franchise business in 
Ethiopia.  
 
3.4.  Trade Secret Law  
The definition of the term “trade secret” may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In most legal systems, any 
confidential business information which provides an enterprise a competitive edge may be considered a trade 
secret.4 It consists of any formula, pattern, devise or combination of information which is used in one’s business, 
and which give a businessperson an opportunity to obtain an advantage over his/her/its competitors who do not 
use the information.5 The trade secret may also be patentable technology.  
Now days, the importance of trade secret agreement is growing in the world of commerce of technology. 
Technology owners may prefer trade secret protection over patent for various reasons. Some of the advantages of 
                                                          
1 Id, Art. 30. 
2 Id, Art 31 (1) . 
3 Id, Art. 31 (2) (a). 
4              , What is a Trade Secret?, http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/trade_secrets.htm  
5 Ibid. 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.55, 2016 
 
179 
trade secret protection are:  
· “Trade secret protection has the advantage of not being limited in time (patents last 
in general for up to 20 years). It may therefore continue indefinitely as long as the 
secret is not revealed to the public. 
· Trade secrets involve no registration costs (though there may be high costs related to 
keeping the information confidential). 
· Trade secrets have immediate effect. 
· Trade secret protection does not require compliance with formalities such as 
disclosure of the information to a Government authority.”1 
As regards TOT, the existence of strong trade secret protection laws protects technology developers and 
entrepreneurs. Such protection may give foreign investors some confidence to transfer certain technologies to 
domestic counterparts. The commercial success of a trade secret user in the domestic market may also instigate 
local firms to discover the secret through honest commercial means, such as reverse engineering, imitation or 
independent development of the technology.2 It is against this background that the trade secret protection regime 
of Ethiopia will be analyzed under this section.  
In Ethiopia, there is no specific legislation which regulates trade secret issues. Yet, there are scattered 
provisions here and there under the Trade Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 813/2014, 
the Commercial Code and the Civil Code which are relevant to issues of trade secret protection.  Art. 8 of the 
proclamation enumerates acts that constitute unfair competition practices. Pursuant to sub Art. 2 (b) of this 
provision, any act of disclosure, possession or use of information of another business person, without the consent 
of the rightful owner contrary to honest commercial practices is considered as unfair compaction act.  Any 
person who commits any of these acts may face administrative, criminal and civil sanctions.  
To begin with administrative sanctions, any person who discloses, possess or uses of the trade secret of 
a business person contrary to honest commercial practices may be punished with a fine from 5% up to 10% of 
his/her/its turnover. 3  This administrative penalty is not grave enough to deter persons from violating the 
provisions of Art. 8 (2) (b) of the proclamation. As to criminal penalties, any person who found guilty of 
infringement of the trade secret protection provision of the proclamation (i.e, Art 8 (2) (b)) may be punished with 
a fine from Birr 5,000 to Birr 50,000 and with simple imprisonment. This criminal penalty is again nominal to 
deter trade secret protection infringements.  
Coming to civil sanctions, the Commercial Code and the Civil Code devoted some provisions to deal 
with unfair competition. A close looks at to this provisions reveal that the two codes do not specifically mention 
the disclosure, possession and use of the information of a business person contrary to honest commercial 
practices as acts of unfair competition.4 Yet, thanks to the provisions of Art. 8 (2) (b) of the Trade Competition 
and Consumer Protection Proclamation, it is possible to read trade secret infringement acts in these provisions. 
This implies that the civil sanctions provided under the two codes as remedy for acts of unfair competition in 
general are applicable to trade secret infringement cases. 
The civil sanctions for the commission of acts of unfair competition are provided under Art. 132 & Art. 
134 of the Commercial Code and Art. 2163 of the Civil Code.  One of these sanctions is injunction of the 
commission of the act by the order of a court of law. This sanction is clearly stipulated under the provisions of 
Art. 134 (1) (b). As per this provision, “the court may, in cases of unfair competition, ... make such orders as are 
necessary to put an end to the unfair competition.” The other civil remedy is indemnity for the damage sustained 
as a result of the unfair competition practice. The court of law is authorized to order that damages may be paid 
                                                          
1 Ibid.  
2 United Nations, supra note 153, at 27. (“It must be noted that trade secrets protection is based on the concept of “unfair 
competition” which does not rule out the discovery and appropriation of someone else’s undisclosed information through 
honest commercial means, such as independent development and reverse engineering. On the contrary, patent on a product 
prevents the unauthorized reverse engineering of that product and even its independent development. As a result, independent 
development of the protected information or its discovery through reverse engineering constitutes a defense to trade secrets 
infringement claims.”) 
3 Trade Competition and Consumers Protection Proclamation No. 813/2014, FEDERAL NEGARIT GAZETA, 20th Year No. 
28, Art. 42 (3), (2013). 
4 The Commercial Code of the Empire of Ethiopia No. 3/1960, NEGARIT GAZETA, 19thYear No. 3, Art. 133, (1960). (As 
per this provision, acts that constitute unfair competition are:  
(a) “any acts likely to mislead customers regarding the undertaking, products or commercial activities of a competitor; 
(b) Any false statements made in the course of business with a view to discrediting the undertaking, products or 
commercial activities of a competitor.”) 
See also the Civil Code, supra note 76, Art. 2057. (This provision, captioned as “Unfair competition” provides that “[a] 
person commits an offence where, through false publications, or by other means contrary to good faith, he compromises the 
reputation of a product or the credit of a commercial establishment.”) 
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by the unfair competitor.1 As to the amount of the damages, the Civil Code provides that:  
“Whosoever has derived a gain from the work or property of another without just cause shall 
indemnify the person at whose expense he has enriched himself to the extent to which he has 
benefited from his work or property.”2 
The above stipulation reaffirms the rule “damages equals damage”.  When compared to the 
administrative and criminal penalties, the civil sanctions seem beneficial to the victim of the unfair competition 
practice. Yet, it is not possible to assert that there is effective trade secret protection law in Ethiopia. Contrary to 
the experience of other jurisdictions, it is not clear whether the use of the protected information by the defendant 
(to be shown by the plaintiff) may constitute a prima facie case of trade secrets misappropriation. At any rate, 
since having effective trade secrets protection could possibly strike an appropriate balance between the interest 
of foreign investors and local competitors, the government should consider enacting separate and comprehensive 
trade secret protection legislation. Doing so may enable the country to build domestic technological capacities 
through informal means of technology transfer. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
The writer this paper analyzed the country’s laws that have direct and indirect impact on the inflow and 
dissemination of foreign technologies. The writer finds no piece of legislation that regulate TOT agreements. 
The analysis of some laws which relates with TOT revealed the inadequacy of the present legal regime that 
governs TOT agreements. It also found some shortcomings of the patent law of the country that may hinder the 
dissimilation of foreign technologies. The absence of adequate incentive in the investment law of the country 
that may encourage foreigners to transfer technology trough joint venture is another finding.  Furthermore, it 
identified that the absence of comprehensive franchise and trade secretes protection laws will be an obstacle for 
foreigners to transfer their technology to Ethiopian partners through franchise and trades secretes agreements. 
Hence, the writer of this paper recommends that the Ethiopian government should take the following measures in 
order to create conducive legal and institutional arrangements to facilitate the inflow and dissemination of 
foreign technologies in the country. 
Ø Determining the terms and conditions of TOT agreements should not be left to the absolute autonomy 
of the parties to the agreement. TOT agreements are not ordinary agreements. They have far reaching 
consequence in national security, public health, and economic and technological development.  Because 
of this many country subject TOT agreements to close scrutiny of government entities. There is no 
reason to adopt lenient TOT regulation in Ethiopia contrary to this general trend. Accordingly, it is high 
time to enact the draft TOT regulation by making the necessary improvements.  
Ø A new provision should be inserted in the draft TOT regulation that provides for different packages of 
incentives to persons who engage in TOT activities. It is very important to give special preference to 
investors who introduce foreign technology and adopt same to local circumstances to encourage 
investors to involve in TOT activities. The writer of this paper suggest that persons who engage in TOT 
activities should be entitled to addition income tax exemption from 1 year to 3 years having regard to 
the relevance of the transferred technology to the priority needs of the country.  
Ø The draft TOT regulation should also establish a special governmental agency that monitor and follow 
up TOT activities. In its present form, the draft empowers MoST to follow up all phases TOT processes, 
from technology search to disposition. Yet, since the ministry is an organ which is tied up with 
bureaucratic hurdles, and, as a result, would not effectively discharge these important responsibilities, a 
special organ should be established. The organ should be staffed with multidisciplinary personnel who 
have the required competency to efficiently deal with the complex issues of TOT.  
Ø A new provision should be added to the Inventions, Minor Inventions and Industrial Designs, 
Proclamation, No. 123/ 1995 which prohibit restrictive patent licensing practices. Restrictive patent 
licensing practices have the effect of hindering the adaptation and dissemination of the licensed 
technology. This effect is contrary to the very purpose of adopting the patent legislation as one of the 
objectives of introducing the patent regime is speeding up the dissemination of technologies. Since the 
patent and the competition laws of the country do not prohibit restrictive patent licensing practices, 
patentees may license their agreements under terms and conditions that defeat the very purpose of the 
patent law.  Hence, the patent law should be amended so as to include a provision that prohibit 
restrictive patent licensing practices. 
Ø The patent law should also require the patent applicant to disclose the best mode of carrying out the 
invention. The patent law requires the patent applicant to disclose at least one mode of carrying out the 
invention. The patent applicant may disclose the mode of carrying out the invention which makes it 
                                                          
1 Ibid, Art. 134 (1) (a). 
2 The Civil Code of the Empire of Ethiopia, Art. 2163.  
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difficult to understand the technology claimed under the patent. The patent law could avoid the problem 
and, thereby, help local technology users by requiring patent applicants to disclose the best mode of 
carrying out the invention. Accordingly, it is recommendable to amend the patent legislation so as to 
adopt this requirement.  
Ø The patent law should further be amended with the view to widen the scope of the experimental use 
exception. The patent law limited the scope of the experimental use exception to cases of basic research. 
It excludes commercial research even if it primarily aimed at the creation of new knowledge.  Since 
commercial researches result in more technology spillover, the scope of the experimental use exception 
should be widen so as to include commercial researches which primarily aimed at the creation of new 
knowledge.  
Ø The investment law should provide adequate incentives to foreigners who invest jointly with Ethiopians 
by contributing technology to the business venture. Under the present legal arrangement, a foreigner 
who invests jointly with Ethiopian partner is entitled to only a reduction of the minimum capital he/she 
is required to allocate for a single investment by USD 50,000. This amount is not adequate enough to 
influence the decision of a foreigner to invent in a wholly owned FDI or jointly with Ethiopian partner. 
In addition to the reduction, income tax exemption to a certain period of time and other preferences 
should be considered.  
Ø The administrative and criminal penalties imposed on trade secretes protection infringers should be 
reconsidered. The administrative penalty the infringer may face is a fine form 5% to 10 % his/her 
turnover. The criminal penalty is a fine from Birr 5,000 to Birr 50,000 and simple imprisonment. These 
penalties are not grave enough to deter a person from infringing the trade secrets of another.  The Trade 
Competition and Consumer Protection Proclamation No. 813/2013 should be amended so as to specify 
sensible penalty on trade secretes infringers. Incidentally, the government should also consider enacting 
a specific bill on trade secrets protection.  
Ø A comprehensive piece of legislation that governs franchising business should be enacted. Now days, 
the franchising business is subject to different rules scattered here and there under the investment 
proclamation, the trade mark proclamation and the patent law. This fragmentation of the rules in 
different legislation crates legal uncertainty. This legal uncertainty may make international franchisors 
hesitant to do business in Ethiopia. This, in turn, may hinder the country from reaping technologies that 
could inflow in to the country had there were legal certainty in the area of franchising business. 
Accordingly, it is advisable to enact a specific bill on franchising.  
Ø On top of amending existing legislations and introducing new laws as recommended above, the 
government should work hard to develop the country’s technological capability to absorb and adapt 
foreign technologies. This can be achieved by establishing technology incubator centers and supporting 
R & D activities. Otherwise, crating suitable legal environment by itself is meaningless as technological 
capability is crucial factor to master foreign technology.  
 
 
